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INTRODUCTION
Is legal scholarship driven mainly by ideas or by tools?1 Decades ago, empirical methods revolutionized legal research, eventually gaining widespread acceptability despite concerns about experimental design.2 More recently, scholars
and judges have begun adopting the methods of corpus linguistics, which map
1

On the origin of this question in science, see Freeman J. Dyson, Is Science Mostly Driven
by Ideas or by Tools?, 338 SCIENCE 1426 (2012).
2 See Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 1195 (2013); see also Joshua Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out of Econometrics, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2010).
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word frequency and collocation, to discern the ordinary meaning of phrases in a
statute or the Constitution.3 These techniques are among the advances of computational legal analysis (CLA), which unleashes quantitative empirical techniques
such as machine learning and natural language processing (NLP) upon legal
texts.4
The newest tool to gain a following in CLA is topic modeling, a form of
NLP that depicts the probability distribution of terms over a corpus of texts.5
Because of its propensity to analyze large, unstructured datasets, topic modeling
has been utilized in a variety of legal research projects.6 While the tool is beginning to draw the level of scrutiny of previous empirical methods, topic modeling
enthusiasts in law sometimes sidestep basic questions such as (i) how do disembodied terms, whatever their interrelation, represent legal doctrine and (ii) should
legal texts be spliced and read in this way?7
A reflexive embrace of topic modeling and, more generally, CLA risks giving machine learning too quick a pass,8 without vetting the underlying algorithms.9 Word frequencies “without regard to position, syntax, content, and semantics” should not comprise the basis for bold claims.10 Unmoored, CLA
3

Corpus linguistics studies language through its usage within a body of texts. TONY
MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS 1 (2001). For examples of its application
in legal scholarship, see Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus
Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1417 (2017); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging
Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018).
4 Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore, Introduction: From Analogue to Digital Legal Scholarship, in LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, & THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS
xiii, xvii (Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore eds., 2019).
5 See Michael A. Livermore et al., The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59 ARIZ. L.
REV. 837, 841–42 (2017); David M. Blei et al., Latent Dirichlet Allocation, 3 J. MACH.
LEARNING RES. 993 (2003).
6 See Livermore et al., supra note 5 (judicial opinions); Bernhard Ganglmair & Malcolm
Wardlaw, Complexity, Standardization, and the Design of Loan Agreements (April 13, 2017)
(working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952567 [https://perm
a.cc/7HXV-2SQG] (loan agreements); David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L.
REV. 153 (2016) (national constitutions).
7 Exceptions include Stanley Fish, If You Count It, They Will Come, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
333 (2019); Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore, Distant Reading and the Law, in
LAW AS DATA, supra note 4, at 3, 3–19.
8 For an explanation of machine learning, see Ryan Copus et al., Credible Prediction: Big
Data, Machine Learning and the Credibility Revolution, in LAW AS DATA, supra note 4, at 21,
23–24 (“Machine learning is not a specific research tool; it is a catch-all term that refers to any
method that features learning by a machine about quantitative data.”).
9
An algorithm is a set of instructions to perform a task, given a specific input. For a recent
example of legal research that harnesses the power of algorithms, see David E. Pozen et al., A
Computational Analysis of Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2019) (measuring the partisan polarization of constitutional terms by gauging how easily a machine learning algorithm can predict a speaker’s ideology or political affiliation).
10 Nan Z. Da, The Computational Case Against Computational Literary Studies, 45 CRIT.
INQUIRY 601, 611 (2019). For a series of spirited responses, see Mark Andrew Algee-Hewitt,
et al., Computational Literary Studies: A Critical Inquiry Online Forum, CRIT. INQUIRY (Mar.
31, 2019, 5:26 PM), https://critinq.wordpress.com/2019/03/31/computational-literary-studies-
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resembles what the philosopher Richard Rorty characterized of certain kinds of
literary criticism as “imposing a vocabulary . . . a ‘grid’ . . . on the text which
may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and
seeing what happens.”11
We aim to correct the oversight by engaging with critiques of machine learning from areas outside law. For topic modeling in particular, although its sheen
is still fresh in legal circles, the technique has circulated for years in digital humanities (DH), the branch of traditional humanities that incorporates machinedriven computation into its analysis.12 DH is a collaborative endeavor at its core,
so when legal scholars borrow its tools without considering assessments of machine analysis from the humanities and computer science, we abandon the spirit
from which we draw inspiration.
More fundamentally, the technical and computational abilities of machine
learning evolve at a startling pace. If legal scholars do not slow down now to
reflect upon the viability of the methodologies—or to reset our collaboration with
statisticians, humanists, and computer scientists—then the likelihood of confronting essential questions grows ever distant.
Rather than merely reciting the diverse critiques of CLA, we incorporate
them to improve machine learning algorithms for legal research. We have built
a machine learning platform that incorporates variations on topic modeling to sift
through large datasets. In the most novel variation, we aggregate multiple layers
of topic modeling into a single set of visualizations.13 The platform has already
been used on a variety of datasets, including archaeological publications,14

a-critical-inquiry-online-forum/ [https://perma.cc/JKM8-ZXH4]; Taylor Arnold & Duncan
Buell, More Responses to “The Computational Case Against Computational Literary Studies,” CRIT. INQUIRY (Apr. 12, 2019, 11:33 AM), https://critinq.wordpress.com/2019/04/12
/more-responses-to-the-computational-case-against-computational-literary-studies/
[https://perma.cc/DL6Z-RTPY].
11 RICHARD RORTY, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism, in
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 139, 151 (1982).
12 See ANNE BURDICK ET AL., DIGITAL_HUMANITIES 3 (2012); Matthew G. Kirschenbaum,
What Is Digital Humanities and What’s It Doing in English Departments?, 150 ADE BULL.
55 (2010).
13 For a prior example of aggregating topic models, see Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, A Machine-Learning History of English Caselaw and Legal Ideas Prior to the Industrial Revolution
I: Generating and Interpreting the Estimates, 17 J. INST. ECON. 1 (2021) [hereinafter Grajzl &
Murrell, Generating and Interpreting the Estimates]; Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, A MachineLearning History of English Caselaw and Legal Ideas Prior to the Industrial Revolution II:
Applications, 17 J. INST. ECON. 201 (2021) [hereinafter Grajzl & Murrell, Applications].
14 Sarah E. Jackson et al., Archaeological Reflexivity: Examining the Substance of Bone,
UNIV. OF CIN. DIGIT. SCHOLARSHIP CTR. (Nov. 3, 2020, 8:02 PM), https://sites.libraries.uc.edu
/dsc/research/projects/archaeological-reflexivity-examining-the-substance-of-bone
[https://perma.cc/AX7B-897X] (to identify patterns in language regarding the substance of
bone).
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Renaissance-era English texts,15 and U.S. census data.16 In the project at hand,
we have applied aggregated modeling to uncover latent patterns in antitrust decisions extracted from Harvard Law School’s Caselaw Access Project (CAP).
Unveiled in 2018, CAP has digitized virtually every published decision in virtually every U.S. jurisdiction.17
Through our modifications, topic modeling can create metadata, similar to
the headnotes of commercial legal databases, that make legal research more efficient. Our central contribution to the growing field of CLA is to take analysis
from the level of words and phrases to the level of topics and documents, providing greater contextualization. The ensuing visualizations, apart from their beauty,
translate topic modeling into intuitive models that law scholars can interpret with
little statistical or empirical training.
We are mindful that our solution to flawed machine learning is more machine learning—or at least better machine learning. Yet most criticisms of algorithmic data extraction and processing can be distilled to one theme: the need to
provide greater contextualization.18 In response, we have not abandoned DH
methods, but sought to improve them.
We have compiled two pools of federal antitrust cases from the CAP corpus:
those featuring the term “market power” and those featuring “regulation.” Our
rationale is that topic modeling visualizations can reveal how courts think
through market power and how they balance antitrust when regulation is implicated. We have chosen to start with market power and the antitrust–regulation
balance because doctrinal ambiguities leave interpretation in these areas wide
open, thereby broadening the terms that courts employ.
Because our platform’s analysis of antitrust cases occurs through machines,
it is bound by neither legal precedent nor economic theory. Thus, our project
addresses not the normative question of how should courts gauge market power
but the empirical question of how do courts gauge market power. While algorithmic processing has its limits,19 machine-generated visualizations can provide a

15

Mapping the Global Renaissance, UNIV. OF CIN. DIGIT. SCHOLARSHIP CTR. (May 27, 2020,
6:24 PM), https://sites.libraries.uc.edu/dsc/research/projects/mapping-the-global-renaissance
[https://perma.cc/R2XK-D7VT] (to examine accounts of race during Shakespeare’s time).
16 Robert Gioielli, CO2 Emissions Racial Study, UNIV. OF CIN. DIGIT. SCHOLARSHIP CTR.
(May 27, 2020, 5:48 PM), https://sites.libraries.uc.edu/dsc/research/projects/co2-emissionsracial-study [https://perma.cc/PGN5-4G2J] (to explore links between race and CO2 emissions
in urban areas). For a full list of projects, see Projects, UNIV. OF CIN. DIGIT. SCHOLARSHIP
CTR., https://sites.libraries.uc.edu/dsc/home [https://perma.cc/BJP9-KRBW].
17 See Harvard L. Sch., About, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/about/ [https://per
ma.cc/PKL9-ZNG8] [hereinafter About the Caselaw Access Project].
18 See, e.g., Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity, 50 SETON HALL
L. REV. 401, 406 (2019) (“Rather than simply serving as another ‘tool in the toolbox’ of statutory interpretation, corpus linguistics is different from traditional tools of statutory interpretation because it leads to interpretations that are radically acontextual.”); Da, supra note 10.
19 See SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE
RACISM (2018); Nathan Newman, How Big Data Enables Economic Harm to Consumers,
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fresh take on thousands of cases.20 Concomitantly, legal doctrines around market
power and the antitrust–regulation balance can help us vet the precision of the
topic modeling algorithms.
Our second contribution is to antitrust itself, which is also at an inflection
point in the oscillation between ideas and tools. More than any time since the rise
of the Chicago school, antitrust today is dominated by ideas. From the new
Brandeis school21 to the multi-sided platform debate,22 weighty ideas on inequality and big tech are driving the conversations in antitrust.23 Often, these conversations unfold without a rigorous methodology to quantify their claims. We see
in topic modeling a new suite of tools to hone the doctrinal and policy arguments,
just as the Harvard school of antitrust refined the Chicago school’s brash theoretical pronouncements decades ago.24 Indeed, sensing the promise of CLA, the
Department of Justice and Stanford Law School recently launched the Computational Antitrust Project to promote efficiency and consistency in antitrust analyses and procedures.25
Aggregated modeling excels in presenting high-level summaries of
caselaw.26 For instance, market power cases splinter into several large categories:
Especially to Low-Income and Other Vulnerable Sectors of the Population, 18 J. INTERNET L.
11 (2014).
20 See Law, supra note 6, at 164–65 (“Topic modeling is well suited to the analysis of large
numbers of complex, varied documents . . . because it is capable of identifying verbal patterns
and substantive topics in raw text without any need for time-consuming and potentially erroneous hand-coding of the text.”); Elliott Ash & Daniel L. Chen, Case Vectors: Spatial Representations of the Law Using Document Embeddings, in LAW AS DATA, supra note 4, at 313,
314 (“[Topic modeling] algorithms have provided a window to the relations between documents at scale.”).
21 See Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust
Movement, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirth
-of-the-u-s-antitrust-movement [https://perma.cc/2VKG-AUB6]; Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents,
11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017).
22 See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF
MULTISIDED PLATFORMS (2016).
23 See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech [https://perma.cc
/5EBM-LST7]; Corporate Accountability and Democracy, BERNIE SANDERS, https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/4LMS-53
CH]; TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018).
24 See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1
(2007).
25 Justice Department Joins Computational Antitrust Project at Stanford Law School, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-joins-computational-antitrust-project-stanford-law-school [https://perma.cc/28N5-ZSJV]; Computational Antitrust, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/projects/computational-antitrust/
[https://perma.cc/2QMT-CBY5].
26 See Grajzl & Murrell, Generating and Interpreting the Estimates, supra note 13; Grajzl &
Murrell, Applications, supra note 13.
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patent, tying, general trial, telecommunications, merger, sports, class action, energy, software, milk, and licensing cases, as well as cases delving deeply into
civil and evidentiary procedure.27 Similarly, from the antitrust–regulation corpus, we see that cases pertaining to the Interstate Commerce Commission were
supplanted over time by telecommunications cases, a pattern consistent with deregulation.28 Doctrinally, these inferences are not necessarily novel, but they do
confirm the conjectures of other antitrust scholars who had theorized from narrower samplings of caselaw.29
Our results are more provocative, however, for what they suggest about
caselaw research. Currently, scholars and practitioners rely heavily on proprietary databases such as Westlaw and Lexis to identify the most relevant cases for
a research question. A search in Westlaw for federal cases bearing the terms “antitrust” and “market power,” for example, yields top results that include Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,30 Jefferson Parish Hospital District
No. 2 v. Hyde,31 United States v. Grinnell Corp.,32 United States v. Microsoft
Corp.,33 and United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,34 all of them classic
cases on market power.35 Curiously, however, these classic cases do not tend to
show up in our visualizations, whether as top terms or as top cases within a
topic.36 By contrast, the top (or most relevant) cases identified by topic modeling
are not prioritized by Westlaw or Lexis, but they are influential nonetheless
among practitioner circles within a particular circuit.37
These results question how Westlaw and Lexis execute their searches, a process that is notoriously opaque.38 For example, how do the commercial databases
differ from widely accepted statistical algorithms in defining what constitutes

27

See infra Part VI.
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330–35 (1998).
29 Narrower sampling is often a feature of qualitative research, and doctrinal research is often
qualitative.
30 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
31 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
32 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
33 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
34 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
35 The other cases in the top eleven were In re Copper Market Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (which did not even include the term “market power” or consider the concept), Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), In re Aggrenox Antitrust
Litig., 199 F. Supp. 3d 662 (D. Conn. 2016), Sentry Data Sys., Inc. v. CVS Health, 379 F.
Supp. 3d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2019), Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 974
(N.D. Cal. 2010), and Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995). The
search was performed on March 20, 2020.
36 The only exception being Microsoft, 253 F.3d.
37 See infra Part IV.
38 See Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact: Implications for Legal
[Re]Search, 109 L. LIBR. J. 387, 389 (2017).
28
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relevant caselaw? In publicizing our algorithms, we hope to nudge the commercial databases toward greater transparency.
Finally, the source of our data, the Caselaw Access Project, portends a sea
change in information retrieval. In recent years, freely available legal repositories
have debuted, promising to democratize legal research.39 Nonetheless, technical
and financial barriers to data extraction and analysis persist. Insurgent challengers to Westlaw and Lexis are pledging to harness innovations in information
technology to deliver “faster and smarter” legal research.40 Yet it is not clear
whether these gatekeepers also intend for research to be cost-effective, especially
for academic and nonprofit communities.
We see our project as a leap in algorithmic topic modeling for legal research,
especially as a complement to commercial databases. The next steps will be to
test a series of hypotheses, against the topic models. Ultimately, we hope that our
project will prompt other collaborations between DH and law, while pressing
information technology insurgents to keep legal research open and cost-effective.
The remainder of this Article will unfold as follows: Part I will canvas critiques of CLA methods and tinker with improvements to topic modeling. Part II
will introduce our platform and summarize our methodology. Part III will present
preliminary findings and will draw inferences that both affirm and complicate
previous antitrust research. Part IV will hazard predictions for the way forward.
I.

TOPIC MODELING LEGAL TEXTS IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA

Machine learning abounds in finance, policing, employment, politics, and
health services,41 but as a research technique, it is just gaining traction in legal
academia.42 Legal scholars are quick to castigate the use of machine learning
and, more broadly, artificial intelligence in law—yet slow to employ them in
legal research. This is an odd conundrum. After all, in our era of big data, data is
king.43 And in law, no data is bigger than legal texts. Applied to a corpus of
caselaw, machines can uncover explicit and latent linguistic and semantic

39

See Gabriella Capone, Democratizing the Law with Open Data, MIT COMPUTATIONAL L.
REP. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://law.mit.edu/pub/democratizingthelawwithopendata/release/2
[https://perma.cc/VZ5R-GRS9].
40 What Is Fastcase?, FASTCASE, https://www.fastcase.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/4X4R3ZJM].
41 See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018).
42 One exception is the application of corpus linguistics to statutory interpretation to discern
the ordinary meaning of language. See, e.g., Gries & Slocum, supra note 3, at 1417. Recently,
BigML also started to provide machine learning services to academics. See BIGML,
https://bigml.com/ [https://perma.cc/2WYY-67L5].
43 For a definition of big data, see Svetlana Sicular, Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists
of Three Parts, Not to Be Confused with Three “V”s, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2013/03/27/gartners-big-data-definition-consistsof-three-parts-not-to-be-confused-with-three-vs/ [https://perma.cc/A2QU-7WTS].
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patterns, bringing out significant word clusters “that the eye cannot see.”44 The
proliferation of free, open-source legal databases and the explosion in data processing capabilities makes our era a truly exciting one for legal research.
Nonetheless, these technical advances do little to address the reservations
that legal scholars harbor toward CLA. The tools of corpus linguistics, for instance, have come under scrutiny for their tendency to decontextualize settings.45
These are variations of DH practices known as “deformance” and “tampering”
at their most extreme, rearranging texts in the fashion of what post-structuralists
call “a new cut.”46
This Part offers topic modeling as a viable tool for legal research. In many
ways more nuanced than word frequency and collocation, topic modeling is beginning to gain traction within CLA, so it is not wholly unfamiliar to law scholars.47 Yet the technique has its deficiencies, as digital humanists and computer
scientists have pointed out.48 This Part therefore reintroduces topic modeling,
especially in triangulation with corpus linguistics and other empirical methods,
which are more familiar. It also summarizes the criticisms of the tool, so as to set
the stage for our improvements.
A. A Primer on Topic Modeling
Topic modeling illustrates the probable distribution of terms and their cooccurrence within a dataset, a process that uncovers latent, or hidden, patterns
within the dataset.49 These patterns are presented as “topics,” where each topic
is comprised of the terms most likely to appear together.50 Topic modeling builds
upon the general concept of modeling, which creates representations of data patterns in a statistically or logically coherent form.51 While models abound in legal
research, topic modeling is performed through machine learning to amplify processing power.52 The tool enables researchers to analyze tomes of data without
44

Lauren F. Klein, Distant Reading After Moretti, Address at the MLA Annual Convention
(Jan. 5, 2018) (transcript available at https://lklein.com/digital-humanities/distant-reading-after-moretti/ [https://perma.cc/73TY-FND8]).
45 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L.
REV. 1503 (2017); Zoldan, supra note 18.
46 Fish, supra note 7, at 339–40.
47 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore et al., Computationally Assisted Regulatory Participation,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977 (2018); see also supra notes 5–6.
48 See Da, supra note 10.
49 See Jason Chuang et al., Interpretation and Trust: Designing Model-Driven Visualizations
for Text Analysis (May 7, 2012), in CHI ’12: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 443, 443 (2012).
50 Chong Wang & David M. Blei, Collaborative Topic Modeling for Recommending Scientific Articles (Aug. 21, 2011), in KDD ’11: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ACM SIGKDD
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 448, 450 (2011).
51 See KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS FOR
LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 234–35 (2017).
52 See id. at 77 (case-based legal reasoning models), 131 (legal argument models), 234 (machine learning models).
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having to manually code them first, as is custom in traditional empirical methods.53
Topic modeling is particularly useful in text-intensive projects because of its
propensity to uncover language patterns. For instance, researchers in one discipline—say, statistics—may cite influential papers within their discipline but miss
relevant papers in another discipline—for example, economics or biology.54 If
topic modeling is run on papers from statistics, economics, and biology, it can
cut through citation biases to identify the terms and topics common to all three
fields, resulting in more useful literature recommendations.
The pervading topic modeling algorithm is latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA),
which reveals the Dirichlet allocation, or multivariable probability distributions,
of topics over a fixed vocabulary within a dataset.55 True to form, LDA was deployed early on in projects such as the Stanford Dissertation Browser, an interactive tool that shows the commonalities across dissertations written at Stanford
from 1993 to 2008, and an algorithm to recommend scientific articles to researchers.56
Two features of topic modeling—its ability to sift through large volumes of
texts and to uncover hidden connections within those texts—make it tantalizing
for legal research. While the tool remains new to law scholars,57 a growing number of researchers are adopting it for projects on loan agreements,58 constitutions
around the world,59 Supreme Court legal opinions,60 control rights in union contracts,61 and English legal concepts prior to the Industrial Revolution.62
While not wholly analogous to topic modeling, corpus linguistics is in some
ways an apt comparator for its trajectory from linguistics into law. Corpus linguistics takes an empirical approach to the study of language by gauging ordinary
meaning through the usage of words and phrases in a corpus, or body, of natural
language texts.63 Its advocates in law, including, most prominently, Justice
Thomas Lee on the Utah Supreme Court, argue that its methods can elucidate
53

Livermore et al., supra note 5, at 842.
See Wang & Blei, supra note 50, at 448.
55 See Blei et al., supra note 5.
56 See Stanford Dissertation Browser: An Experiment in Document Exploration, STAN. NAT.
LANGUAGE PROCESSING GRP., https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/dissertations/ [https://perma.
cc/2KWK-PC8U]; Chuang et al., supra note 49, at 446; Wang & Blei, supra note 50, at 448.
57 In 2016, David Law identified only two instances of topic modeling in legal research. See
Law, supra note 6, at 164 n.31.
58 Ganglmair & Wardlaw, supra note 6.
59 Law, supra note 6.
60 See Greg Leibon et al., Bending the Law: Geometric Tools for Quantifying Influence in the
Multinetwork of Legal Opinions, 26 A.I. & L. 145 (2018); Livermore et al., supra note 5.
61 Elliott Ash et al., The Language of Contract: Promises and Power in Union Collective Bargaining Agreements (Mar. 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://extranet.sioe.org/uploads/sioe2019/ash_macleod_naidu.pdf).
62 See Grajzl & Murrell, Generating and Interpreting the Estimates, supra note 13.
63 For a concise summary with direct applicability to law, see Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 3,
at 828–80. See also MCENRY & WILSON, supra note 3, at 1.
54
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ordinary meaning of words and phrases in statutory interpretation.64 Among law
schools, Brigham Young University has invested most heavily in the marriage of
corpus linguistics and law, building out two corpora of texts—a database of 5.2
billion words from web-based newspapers and magazines since 2010 and a historical database of over 400 million words from the 1810s to the 2000s—that
formed the basis for some of Justice Lee’s work.65 Researchers can perform functions that count word frequency, identify other words located in close proximity,
and display concordance—or a key word in the context of its surroundings.66
These capabilities help piece together the ordinary meaning and semantic contexts of key words. This approach has caught on as a new form of empirical
analysis, possibly even hewing close to originalism.67
Understandably, corpus linguistics has provoked denunciation. Legal scholars have decried as “radically acontextual” the separation of statutory language
“from its distinctly legal context.”68 Word frequency and collocation
crowdsource for meaning by scanning random corpora of natural language, including sources of dubious judicial value such as Urban Dictionary.69 All in all,
as critics point out, the faith of corpus linguistics adherents in technique seems
to derive from a mistrust of judicial discretion, as if word frequency conveys a
more objective, verifiable truth than the intuition of judges.70 In countering that
judges may be more accountable for their decisions than machine learning technocrats,71 critics echo a broader skepticism of artificial intelligence as an unelected, unaccountable decision-maker that is incapable of empathy.72 For these
scholars, corpus linguistics may offer an impartiality that is simply too elusive to
stand in place of human analysis and judgment.
We can reach even further back to find a comparable antecedent for topic
modeling in empirical legal studies (ELS), which approaches law through

64

See generally Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 261 (2019); Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 3.
65 See NOW Corpus (News on the Web), ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG, https://www.english-corpora.org/now/ [https://perma.cc/X2GD-X39P].
66 See Mark Davies, English-Corpora.org: A Guided Tour, ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG (Nov.
2020), https://www.english-corpora.org/pdf/english-corpora.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MZE-98
VV].
67 See BYU L.: L. & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/6Z3
U-UWGA]. Other recent examples of its application include Jennifer Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 564 (2018); Josh Blackman & James C.
Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/
[https://perma.cc/6VED-DL7N].
68 Zoldan, supra note 18, at 447.
69 Id. at 417.
70 See Hessick, supra note 45, at 1512.
71 See id. at 1517–18.
72 See Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 146 (2019).
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empirical methods.73 ELS has a rich history,74 one that cannot be adequately
summarized here, but in the course of that history, it has had to contend with two
criticisms that are relevant to the rise of topic modeling. The first is that empirical
research has suffered a “credibility revolution” in its use of observed data to
make causal inferences.75 Starting in economics, this revolution forced empirical
researchers in all fields to root out bias through better research design.76 Related
to this point about rigor is a second critique—that ELS lacks a theoretical framework. This charge manifests as different variations: that ELS scholarship is too
data-driven,77 that it fetishizes technique at the expense of the bigger picture.78
Topic modeling, of course, is distinct from both the techniques of corpus
linguistics and the approach of ELS. When legal texts are taken as the data
source, topic modeling avoids the corpus linguistics pitfall of looking to irrelevant sources. Corpus linguistics, by contrast, is usually deployed in the hunt for
ordinary meaning as part of statutory interpretation, which justifies departing
from legal texts.79 The analogy to ELS also breaks down if topic modeling is not
being used for predictive purposes. After all, topic modeling was invented by
computer scientists as an information retrieval mechanism, even though it has
since been adopted as a predictive mechanism.80 We, too, employ topic modeling
to gather information and verify doctrinal claims rather than make predictions.
Functionally, our use of the tool diverges with one of the primary goals of ELS
and the subject of its denigration.81
Nonetheless, topic modeling is still vulnerable to the same reproach of overreliance on disembodied words that plagues corpus linguistics.82 More specifically, how can we account for context in performing statistical analysis (fundamentally a quantitative endeavor)? We anticipate questions from ELS as well.
How can we ensure that topic modeling does not merely dazzle with its technical
prowess but shows us something significant? Put differently, why should we care

73

For a more fundamental summary of empirical legal studies, see Theodore Eisenberg, The
Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1720 (2011) (“[A] core principle [of empirical legal studies] seems indisputable: it is better to have more systematic knowledge of how the legal system works
rather than less, regardless of the normative implications of that knowledge.”).
74 See, e.g., id. at 1713–14; Ho & Kramer, supra note 2.
75 Copus, supra note 8, at 21.
76 Angrist & Pischke, supra note 2, at 14; Copus, supra note 8, at 21.
77 Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1733.
78 Brian Leiter, On So-Called “Empirical Legal Studies” and Its Problems, BRIAN LEITER’S
L. SCH. REP. (July 6, 2010), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalledempirical-legal-studies.html [https://perma.cc/JUA5-A7K2].
79 For a summary of this hunt for ordinary meaning, see Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 3, at
796–800.
80 See Benjamin M. Schmidt, Words Alone: Dismantling Topic Models in the Humanities, 2
J. DIGIT. HUMANS. 49, 51 (Winter 2012).
81 See Copus, supra note 8, at 24–25, 29.
82 See Da, supra note 10, at 635.
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about these results? And if the method is so important, what steps have we taken
to guarantee its rigor?
These questions will be answered in turn in the following Sections.
B. Criticisms of Topic Modeling
In introducing our community of legal scholars and antitrust practitioners to
aggregated modeling, we have written previously on reservations about this tool
within digital humanities and computer science.83 The primary critique is that it
rearranges terms into topics at the expense of context.84 Decontextualization can
lead to overclaims and misinterpretation.85 Given its dexterity, topic modeling
can lead users into a labyrinth of terms and topics, so that they lose perspective
either through the grand sweep of the topics in totality (that is, too much macroscale) or through the number of terms within a topic (that is, too much microscale). To borrow from Gulliver’s Travels, the eighteenth-century satire at the
outset of the Enlightenment’s scientific discoveries, topic modeling creates both
a gargantuan world and a miniscule world, and the user may be adrift at both
extremes.86
This propensity to decontextualize—or, more appropriately, recontextualize—is an inherent feature of topic modeling. In fact, recontextualization is one
of the tool’s major draws. After all, topic modeling is a form of distant reading
that illuminates patterns in texts—especially large volumes of texts—that cannot
be seen by the human eye in close readings.87 While distant reading appears to
belie the close textual analysis that underpins legal research, especially qualitative doctrinal research, the reality is that law scholars have implemented the
quantitative methods of social sciences for decades, and CLA methods are
merely the latest development. The challenge, then, is to temper both the errors
and disorientation of topic modeling, while setting topics and terms in their
proper context. More specifically, topic modeling visualizations must be able to
83

See, e.g., Felix B. Chang et al., Doctrinal Implications of Computational Antitrust, 1 STAN.
J. COMPUTATIONAL ANTITRUST 117, 120–21 (2021) [hereinafter Chang et al., Computational
Antitrust]; Felix B. Chang, The Topic Modeling Revolution, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 8–9) (on file with author).
84 See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 80, at 50–51 (panning topic modeling as little more than a
“rearrangement algorithm” and, without proper supervision, a “bad research assistant”).
85 Da, supra note 10, at 611; see also Nan Z. Da, Computational Literary Studies: Participant
Forum Responses, Day 2, IN THE MOMENT (Apr. 2, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://critinq.wordpress.com/2019/04/02/computational-literary-studies-participant-forum-responses-day-2-2/
[https://perma.cc/5CWT-79QF] (“First, there is statistically rigorous [computational literary
studies] work that cannot actually answer the question it sets out to answer or doesn’t ask an
interesting question at all. Second, there is work that seems to deliver interesting results but is
either nonrobust or logically confused . . . . If the conclusions we find in CLS corroborate or
disprove existing knowledge, this is not a sign that they are correct but that they are tautological at best, merely superficial at worst.”).
86 See generally JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS (1726).
87 Livermore & Rockmore, supra note 7, at 4; see also Klein, supra note 44.
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break topics down to their constituent words and aggregate all topics into networks—to depict the relationships among topics just as they illustrate the relationships among terms.
Notably, contextual shifts can also come from words themselves. Over time,
for instance, usage evolves; spellings change, registers shift, and terms assume
ironic connotations.88 Topics must capture all the dynamic ranges of a word to
be comprehensive. To cite a more specific example from antitrust, the prevailing
paradigm of market power is first to define the relevant product and geographic
markets and then to calculate the market shares of the defendant within those
markets.89 Our visualizations capture several topics where the term “relevant” is
featured prominently. As a check, we review the cases within those topics to
ensure that “relevant” refers to market definition rather than the relevance of a
legal or factual argument.90
Digital humanists and computer scientists have pointed out other shortcomings of topic modeling. Some of them are relevant to legal scholarship and can
be addressed; others may be relevant but cannot be programmed around.91 In the
first camp is the argument that LDA had been created to perform information
retrieval functions rather than the analytical and predictive functions that have
come to be associated with the algorithm.92 For example, the computer scientist
David Blei thought topic modeling would make “large collections of text browsable by giving useful tags to the documents,” a function similar to Westlaw’s insertion of headnotes.93 Those functions, as we shall show later, include tagging
caselaw with helpful metadata to enable more efficient browsing, rather than to
make predictions about how a case might come out.
Finally, humanities scholars have rebuked the digitization of their field in
ways that have some applicability to legal research.94 These include institutional
88

See Schmidt, supra note 80, at 57 (“In any 150-year topic model, for example, the spelling
of ‘any one’ will change to ‘anyone,’ ‘sneaked’ to ‘snuck’, and so forth. The model is going
to have to account for those changes somehow, either by simply forcing all topics to occupy
narrow bands of time, or by assuming that the vocabulary of (say) chemistry did not change
from 1930 to 1980.”).
89 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 6.4 (5th ed. 2016).
90 See infra Part IV.
91 See Danielle Allington et al., Neoliberal Tools (and Archives): A Political History of Digital Humanities, L.A. REV. OF BOOKS (May 1, 2016), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/neoliberal-tools-archives-political-history-digital-humanities/ [https://perma.cc/CG33-D4JP]
(“[T]he unparalleled level of material support that Digital Humanities has received suggests
that its most significant contribution to academic politics may lie in its (perhaps unintentional)
facilitation of the neoliberal takeover of the university.”).
92 Schmidt, supra note 80, at 50 (“New ways of reading the composition of topics are necessary, because humanists seem to want to do slightly different things with topic models than
the computer scientists who invented them and know them best.”).
93 Id. Indeed, precursors of LDA such as latent semantic analysis had been designed for indexing and information retrieval. See Scott Deerwester et al., Indexing by Latent Semantic
Analysis, 41 J. AM. SOC. INFO. SCI. 391, 391 (1990).
94 See Allington et al., supra note 91.
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and political economy criticisms that DH replicates a Silicon Valley ethos of
disruption for disruption’s sake while masking a neoliberal takeover of university
research functions.95 Computational analysis saps institutions of traditional
scholarly research and writing, replacing these functions instead with grants-dependent research labs. Additionally, the corpora from which documents are extracted and the programmers coding the algorithms often do not accommodate
diverse perspectives.96 These shortcomings are important to bear in mind as CLA
moves forward, even if they are not completely within the control of law scholars.
C. Aggregated Modeling
This Section introduces the features of our aggregated modeling, which aggregates—or embeds—up to six different LDA topic models in one iteration.
Aggregation of topics into clusters has been done by other scholars to achieve a
bird’s-eye perspective on major themes.97 At this point, we believe it still should
be paired with other tools for caselaw research to be comprehensive, and we
leave the next Part to fully describe our methodology. We argue that the full suite
of these topic modeling tools can streamline caselaw research by adding
metadata, comprised of topics and their constituent terms, to signal relevance to
a user’s research questions. Because topic modeling is still rather novel in law,
we have tried to deploy them more for information retrieval than predictive functions.
Beyond achieving a bird’s-eye perspective, aggregation also generates a
multilevel “model of models” that assuages some contextualization, robustness,
and reproducibility concerns. Our platform has the capacity to render clusters in
three different types of visualizations. In network view, topic clusters situate topics in both large and small contexts through vector space modeling, which strews
clusters across space. Figure 1 depicts how topics in the Antitrust–Regulation
corpus cluster, while Figure 2 presents a close-up of Cluster 3, featuring “rate,”
“gas,” “commission,” “rates,” and “ferc” [F.E.R.C.] as the top terms.

95
96
97

See id.
See id.; Klein, supra note 44.
See Grajzl & Murrell, Applications, supra note 13, for an example of manual aggregation.
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FIGURE 1: NETWORK VIEW OF ANTITRUST–REGULATION CASES IN MODEL OF MODELS

FIGURE 2: CLOSE-UP VIEW OF ANTITRUST–REGULATION CASES WITH DOCUMENT
RETRIEVAL

In classic vector space models, such as Google’s Word2Vec, algorithms process the conceptual relations between words and depict each word as a vector, or
dimension, in space.98 The angle between two vectors, or their cosine, portrays
the magnitude of difference between those words. The dimension reduction approach of Word2Vec aids in interpretability, portraying related words as crowding together and dissimilar words as far-flung. This intuition, that related words
congregate, informs our network visualization of the models’ vector spacing so
that we can represent and calculate distance and similarity between topic vectors.

98

See Thomas Mikolov et al., Distributed Representations of Words and Phrases and Their
Compositionality, in 1 NIPS ’13: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 3136 (C.J.C. Burges et al. eds., 2013); Ash &
Chen, supra note 20, at 315–17.
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The hierarchies of topics and cluster topics is even clearer in “tree” view.
The graphic at the center of Figure 3 has grouped topics in the Antitrust–Regulation corpus into fifteen different clusters (numbered 0–14), represented by the
larger nodes. Each large cluster is in turn broken down into constituent topics,
represented by smaller nodes. Clicking on a topic brings up the top terms. Here,
the energy-themed Cluster 3 is comprised of six topics, and the highlighted topic
features the top terms “rate,” “rates,” “city,” “electric,” “doctrine,” “energy”
(hidden), “price” (hidden), “utility” (hidden), “regulatory” (hidden), and “wholesale” (hidden).99 Clicking on the cluster brings up the top documents, or decisions, on the left-hand panel (here, the top case is Snake River Valley Electric
Ass’n v. PacifiCorp).100 The right-hand panel shows each cluster and the number
of decisions (#docs), the number of topics (#topics), and the top terms in that
cluster. The size of each cluster or topic node represents the number of the constituent topics or documents, respectively—or, put differently, the significance
of the cluster or topic to the overall corpus.
FIGURE 3: MULTILEVEL VISUALIZATION OF ANTITRUST–REGULATION CASES IN TREE
FORMAT

Finally, “circle” view highlights the topics where certain terms appear. Figure 4 highlights the recurrence of the term “commission” across topics pertaining
to telecommunications, transportation, energy, and the ICC.

99

Note that the stop words “court,” “law,” “plaintiff,” “defend,” “defendant,” “see,” “act,”
“f3d,” “plaintiffs,” and “defendants” have been excluded.
100 Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2001).
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FIGURE 4: CIRCLE VIEW SHOWING THE RECURRENCE OF THE TERM “COMMISSION”

Model aggregation produces several improvements to traditional topic modeling. Aggregation enhances model stability. Whereas traditional topic models
may yield different results on different runs,101 our algorithms run topic models
at least twenty times for each query, an iterative process that strips away the
insignificant topics. The resulting clusters are comprised of the most stable and
persistent topics over multiple iterations. Additionally, aggregation also generates visualizations that set topics in both large and small contexts. Clusters reveal
the interconnections among topics, represented in a spatial arrangement that also
depicts their semantic difference from one another. Simultaneously, the document retrieval interface allows users to pull up the relevant cases for each topic.
In the end, we deploy topic modeling not so much for its predictive ability
or even its insight into the meaning of words in themselves but for its indexing
and information retrieval capabilities. The case retrieval function showcases the
words of a topic model in their original context in each decision. All the additional information presented in the visualizations—from network connections to
topic clusters—can be taken as metadata that signal the relevance of antitrust
cases to particular words and topics. This, in effect, is the same functions that
subscribers pay lavish fees to Westlaw and Lexis for. It is, as we shall argue, a
necessary check to the proprietary databases, which are notoriously opaque about
their algorithms.
II. METHODOLOGY
Big data caselaw research is often hindered by two primary obstacles. First,
only a few repositories hold a corpus of easily extractable caselaw.102 Second,
101

See, e.g., Da, supra note 10, at 625.
The leading commercial databases, Westlaw and Lexis, are not conducive to high-volume
data mining because they require licenses and complicated APIs. Other platforms, such as the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR filing system or the U.S. Federal
102
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even if cases could be easily extracted, their interpretation is limited by modeling
that can translate machine analysis into intuitive visualizations.103
This Part begins by showing how we tried to overcome both obstacles. For
data interpretation, we adjust traditional topic modeling algorithms to generate
visualizations of both pools of cases. We pair our aggregated modeling with
open-source topic modeling algorithms, so the composites reflect the various dimensions of the corpora. The open-source visualizations are fairly easy to replicate: they incorporate the work of programmers and DH scholars who have made
the tools freely available.104 While we have selected this suite of topic modeling
algorithms for fit to one another, we have also done so out of the interests of
transparency and reproducibility. Our hope is that data interpretation will be as
open as data extraction.
This Part begins by introducing the CAP. Then it explains our data and processing procedures, before concluding with how we validated models through
coherence and stability checks.
A. The Caselaw Access Project
CAP, a partnership among Harvard Law School’s Library Innovation Lab,
its Berkman-Klein Center, and the legal research company Ravel Law, spent over
three years to simply digitize all court decisions published in the 40,000 bound
volumes in the Harvard Law School Library.105 The resulting database is the
most comprehensive of its kind outside of the Library of Congress.106 CAP’s
cases span some 360 years and all federal and state courts, as well as territorial
courts in American Samoa, Dakota Territory, Guam, Native American Courts,
Navajo Nation, and the Northern Mariana Islands.107
The great advantage of the CAP dataset is that cases are provided in a clean,
digestible form, so users need not write application programming interfaces
(APIs) to pull data.108 Texts are presented in machine-readable format, greatly

Register, do not hold cases. Despite the proclivity of law for natural language text mining,
easy access to copious amounts of caselaw is limited.
103 See generally Chuang et al., supra note 49, at 443–44.
104 The topic browser visualization is adapted from Andrew Goldstone’s dfr-browser project.
See Andrew Goldstone, DFR-Browser: Take a MALLETT to Disciplinary History, ANDREW
GOLDSTONE, https://agoldst.github.io/dfr-browser/ [https://perma.cc/8P27-SDHT]; Ben Mabey, Welcome to PyLDAvis’s Documentation!, PYLDAVIS, https://pyldavis.readthedocs.io/en/
latest/index.html [https://perma.cc/CR4B-2SBP].
105 See About the Caselaw Access Project, supra note 17.
106 Jason Tashea, Caselaw Access Project Gives Free Access to 360 Years of American Court
Cases, ABA J. (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/caselaw
_access_project_gives_free_access_to_360_years_of_american_court_cas
[https://perma.cc/674H-N8E3].
107 About the Caselaw Access Project, supra note 17.
108 See Harvard L. Sch., Tools, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/tools/
[https://perma.cc/6JZ2-9XSG] [hereinafter Caselaw Access Project Tools] (“Our downloads
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simplifying big data projects.109 Cases can be extracted through either APIs or
bulk downloads.110 By contrast, commercial legal databases require users to utilize their own APIs to pull large volumes of cases, as well as the execution of
license agreements.111
CAP will disrupt legal research. By making freely available all published
decisions in nearly every U.S. jurisdiction, it threatens the Westlaw and Lexis
paywalls, greatly expanding legal access for anyone with an internet connection.
The database is free for the public, though LexisNexis, which now owns Ravel
Law, controls commercial use.112
Apart from comprehensiveness, CAP is also run on a versatile interface that
has shared stock APIs for software developers.113 It also includes basic searching, browsing, and downloading functions, as well as the ability to explore historical trends in the caselaw.114 Given CAP’s flexibility and ease of use, law
scholars have already begun using it for big data projects.115
CAP does have limitations. Notably, it excludes cases published after June
2018 and cases not designated as officially published, such as some lower court
decisions. The scope restrictions also leave out unpublished trial documents,
such as filings and exhibits. Nonetheless, the corpus is large enough to compile
rich models and graphs.
B. Data and Processing
Data for our project was made available through CAP, which contains 6.9
million unique cases (and over 1.8 million federal cases).116 Having applied for
and obtained researcher access from CAP, we gathered data by writing pythonbased calls to its API. CAP’s own APIs feature tools that permit searching
through all text in selected cases (as opposed to searches using tags or other
metadata). We created two pools of cases: all federal cases with the word “antitrust,” a total of approximately 36,000 cases, and all federal cases with the word
directory includes derivative datasets, bulk exports, and summaries from the Caselaw Access
Project.”).
109 See Harvard L. Sch., Download Files, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/download/ [https://perma.cc/MC3X-SZDA].
110 Id.; Tashea, supra note 106.
111 We spent close to a year negotiating license agreements with Westlaw and Lexis and also
tinkering with APIs—until CAP went live.
112 Tashea, supra note 106.
113 See id.
114 See Caselaw Access Project Tools, supra note 108.
115 See, e.g., Jaromir Savelka et al., Improving Sentence Retrieval from Case Law for Statutory
Interpretation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 113, 113–22 (2019) (Can.); Jonathan H. Choi, An Empirical Study of Statutory Interpretation in Tax Law, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 382 (2020).
116 See Harvard L. Sch., Our Data, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law
[https://perma.cc/9HJL-XK67]. Note that at the time of writing, CAP had approximately 6.7
million unique federal and state cases and 1.8 million federal cases.
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“regulation,” a total of approximately 305,000 cases. These serve as the bases
for further refinements to the corpora: we filtered the first pool for all decisions
with the term “market power” (the “Market Power Corpus”), totaling 2,591; we
also filtered the second pool for all decisions with the term “antitrust” (the “Antitrust–Regulation Corpus”), totaling 7,308.
Two limitations in CAP data help explain the relatively small number of
cases. First, CAP stops in 2018 at Volume 281 of the third series of the Federal
Supplement and Volume 881 of the third series of the Federal Reporter, omitting
approximately two years of recent cases. Second, CAP excludes unpublished decisions.117
Manual assessment quickly becomes impracticable when examining corpora
of these sizes. Thus, the application of machine learning provides a more manageable approach. We use LDA as the baseline algorithm to sort through each
case’s natural language and produce models of topics based on the clustering of
frequently recurring words.118 LDA proceeds in two steps: first, the algorithm
groups words that have a high probability of co-occurrence into word clusters,
or topics; then, it identifies the decisions where each topic is most likely to appear. This computational approach to language allows us to see certain trends
through topics generated from the caselaw documents’ own semantic and syntactic structures, rather than applying human data and metadata structures to a
dataset. Put differently, machine learning has the potential to provide a neutral
way of ordering this volume of caselaw, devoid of human—and doctrinal—preconceptions.
Using the text search and analytics engine Elasticsearch (a full-text search
and analytics engine)119 and the python Gensim package,120 we built a web-based
platform. The platform performs topic modeling by using the unsupervised machine learning clustering algorithm LDA to sift through and index decisions. For
preprocessing, we utilized Porter Stemmer to excise the suffixes of every word
of the corpora.121
C. Triangulation of Models
Although multilevel visualizations generated from model aggregation are
our greatest technical contribution, in analyzing the corpora we often employ two
other variations on topic models to bring additional perspectives. One such set
of visualizations, “topic browser,” organizes the corpora into topics grouped by

117

For additional verification of this number, including on Westlaw and the CAP platform,
see Chang et al., Computational Antitrust, supra note 83, at 123–24.
118 See Blei et al., supra note 5, at 993, 996–97.
119 The Heart of the Free and Open Elastic Stack, ELASTIC, https://www.elastic.co/products/elasticsearch [https://perma.cc/C2GL-N65T].
120 Gensim 4.1.2, PYPI, https://pypi.org/project/gensim/ [https://perma.cc/M8XH-XHEZ].
121 Martin Porter, The Porter Stemming Algorithm, TARTARUS.ORG (2006), https://tartarus.org/martin/PorterStemmer [https://perma.cc/JN72-DHEA].
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recurring terms.122 Topic browser visualizations are particularly useful for illustrating the changes in the significance of all topics over time—that is, what topics
comprise a greater proportion of the corpora over time and how its constituent
decisions ebb and flow in number (see Figures 5 and 6).
FIGURE 5: MARKET POWER CASES THROUGH THE DECADES (TOPIC BROWSER VIEW)

FIGURE 6: TOP TERMS AND CASES IN TOPIC 11 (TOPIC BROWSER VIEW)

For ease of document retrieval and term cross-referencing, we have engineered topic browser views to enable a user to click on a topic to pull up its top
terms and cases. Clicking on a term then creates listing of all topics where the

122

Topic browser visualizations are adapted from the work of the DH scholar Andrew Goldstone. See Goldstone, supra note 104.
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term recurs.123 Likewise, clicking on a decision pulls up the topics where the
decision can be found. Every decision in the corpus can also be found in the
bibliography section of the platform, indexed by year (see Figure 7).
FIGURE 7: BEGINNING OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE MARKET POWER CORPUS

In another set of visualizations, python-based LDA visualizations (pyLDAvis), the user sees the corpus in four quadrants, with the distance between topics
(represented by bubbles) serving as a proxy for their semantic distance.124 This
depiction resembles the Word2Vec architecture.125 In our adaptation, the size of
each topic bubble represents the significance of that topic to the corpus. Clicking
on a topic pulls up its top terms.126

123

For illustrations, see Chang et al., Computational Antitrust, supra note 83.
pyLDAvis is derived from the framework of the programmer Ben Mabey. See Mabey,
supra note 104.
125 See Jay Alammar, The Illustrated Word2Vec, JAY ALAMMAR (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://jalammar.github.io/illustrated-word2vec/ [https://perma.cc/45VT-9BEH]. For a criticism of Word2Vec from the legal perspective, see Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law
Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2018).
126 See Carson Sievert & Kenneth E. Shirley, LDAvis: A Method for Visualizing and Interpreting Topics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON INTERACTIVE LANGUAGE LEARNING,
VISUALIZATION, AND INTERFACES 63, 66 (Jason Chuang et al. eds., 2014).
124
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FIGURE 8: PYLDAVIS VIEW OF ANTITRUST–REGULATION CASES

In totality, multilevel, topic browser, and pyLDAvis models triangulate and
better contextualize the results. However, as with any empirical project based on
copious amounts of data, term relevance and topic modeling are subject to margins of error, or instability (sometimes called “wobbling”).127 We have found
that the wobble is slight for two of the three types of visualizations (topic browser
and pyLDAvis) and virtually negligible for the third (aggregated). As discussed
in the prior Section, aggregated modeling minimizes variance by running any
query up to twenty times.
D. Model Validation
As in prior collaborations between DSC and other academic units,128 we
have undertaken a multiprong approach to validating our aggregated models,
through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. This approach
includes (i) coherence testing to vet semantic integrity in the topics, (ii) aggregation itself to stabilize the models, and (iii) review of the top cases in a cluster to
ensure conformity with the cluster’s themes. All in all, this opens the black box
of unsupervised ML for scrutiny.

127

See Margaret E. Roberts et al., Navigating the Local Modes of Big Data: The Case of Topic
Models, in COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: DISCOVERY AND PREDICTION 51 (R. Michael Alvarez ed., 2016).
128 See, e.g., Margaret V. Powers-Fletcher et al., Convergence in Viral Outbreak Research:
Using Natural Language Processing to Define Network Bridges in the Bench-Bedside-Population Paradigm, HARV. DATA SCI. REV., Winter 2021, https://hdsr.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/xh
ht1a9s/release/2 [https://perma.cc/C88D-XEQG].
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Coherence measures the degree of semantic similarity among top terms
within a topic.129 We gauge coherence by testing three variables across topics
from several models (alphas, which represent the initial topic probability distributions; betas, which represent term density within a topic; and number of topics
in a model, from 10 to 40). (We hold constant one variable and then calculate
coherence while varying the other two variables.) We scored coherence on the
Market Power Corpus, with stop words excluded; as a baseline, we also ran random coherence on 10,000 documents from the Caselaw Access Project.
For the Market Power Corpus, the minimum and maximum coherence scores
were 0.40858 and 0.60601, respectively.130 We found coherence to be higher
when running fifteen topics; hence, we feature the details for this set of multilevel
models in the Appendix. For the 10,000 documents, these figures were 0.36367
and 0.49062, respectively.131 The relatively tight range of coherence across variables, particularly in the 10,000-document corpus, most likely reflects the regimented vocabulary of the CAP dataset. In other words, legal decisions tend to
use a fairly standardized vocabulary.
Ideally, we would be aiming for coherence at 0.6 or above. However, these
metrics are part of a broader debate over modeling in the data science community.132 For our part, we lean on the subject matter expertise of our transdisciplinary team to further assess the reliability of our models. Reviewing the top cases
in the clusters to check for relevance and conformity with antitrust doctrine allows us to assess the dependability of the results.
To enhance model stability, we have designed the platform to run six models
from random seeds of a corpus, which are then integrated into one visualization.133 The aggregation of topics into clusters emphasizes the overlapping terms
and topics from parallel runs while omitting the insignificant ones.
Finally, we have made our code available for transparency and ease of replication.134

129

Shashank Kapadia, Evaluate Topic Models: Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA): A Step-byStep Guide to Building Interpretable Topic Models, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://towardsdatascience.com/evaluate-topic-model-in-python-latent-dirichlet-allocationlda-7d57484bb5d0 [https://perma.cc/8445-N92N].
130 See CaseLaw Hyperparameter Evaluation 91521 (accessible at https://docs.google.com
/spreadsheets/d/1y-qpwlyjQ8WghsTzSjNccjgjM3qGpmcdkInUotbv334/edit#gid=273508
978 [https://perma.cc/Z6J7-GLCX] (tab 2)).
131 Id. at tab 1.
132 See, e.g., Chuang et al., supra note 49.
133 For an extensive discussion of our methodology and model validation, see Chang et al.,
Computational Antitrust, supra note 83.
134 See Ezra Edgerton, Covid Network Bridges Paper Code, GITHUB: UCDSCENTER (Nov. 2,
2020), https://github.com/ucdscenter/Covid_Network_Bridges_code [https://perma.cc/M2BZ
-4YA6]. The modeling source code is the same for our project, even though this page has the
title of a different collaboration.
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III. RESULTS
To test our modifications to LDA, we analyzed large numbers of federal antitrust cases up to 2018, which we extracted from CAP. The machine-generated
visualizations shed light on two vexing areas of antitrust law: market power and
the balance between antitrust and regulation. Because law is a text-heavy field,
topic modeling is particularly appropriate as an analytical tool. And because antitrust concepts are open-ended and resolved through the deliberation of associated terms, antitrust is an apt place to start.
Our results fall into three categories. The first category consists of big-picture observations that flow from the macroscopic perspective of topic models.
These observations validate certain doctrinal views articulated in prior scholarship on matters such as deregulation and market power. The second category is
comprised of observations that challenge straightforward interpretation. In these
results, the cases do not seem to fit with their categorization in a topic, which
raises questions about the sensitivity and accuracy of the algorithms. The third
category consists of results that raise questions about traditional caselaw research. These questions include how commercial legal databases execute their
searches and what constitutes good precedent in antitrust.
We understand that legal scholars are often skeptical of algorithmic processing and, except for those in the CLA camp, have generally refrained from
employing them in research. For all their utopian promises, algorithms in society
seem to amplify, rather than eliminate, human biases.135 Accordingly, because
we rely so heavily on algorithms for this project, we have tried to be cautious in
their use and in our conclusions. Therefore, rather than disrupting for disruption’s
sake, we offer topic modeling as a way to affirm—but also to complicate—traditional research and prior conclusions on antitrust doctrine.
The remainder of this Part offers a doctrinal primer on market power and the
antitrust–regulation balance. Then it categorizes our observations.
A. A Doctrinal Primer
1. Market Power
Market power is a concept fraught with controversy. Conceptually, it is easy
to grasp: market power means the ability to set price above a producer’s marginal
cost.136 Practically, however, it is difficult to prove. Direct evidence, such as of

135

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO
STATE L.J. 1217 (2017); Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283 (2019);
Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 72, at 137; Levendowski, supra note 125.
136 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 937, 939 (1981).
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anticompetitive effects,137 is often too hard to come by.138 Hence, courts must
abide by circumstantial evidence of market power, which uses market share as a
proxy.139
This paradigm—market definition/market share—has become both the prevailing way of gauging market power and, simultaneously, the target of generations of fierce criticism.140 In the first step of the paradigm, a relevant product
market is defined, enabling the subsequent calculation of a defendant’s relevant
market share.141 The product market is drawn, in technical terms, as “the smallest
grouping of sales for which the elasticity of demand and supply” are low enough
that a monopolist controlling the grouping “could profitably reduce output and
increase price substantially above marginal cost.”142 Then, the relevant geographical market is defined along similar lines, and the defendant’s geographic
market share is also calculated.143
Market definition has come under fire from scholars for decades because of
its imprecision.144 The controversy stretches back to one of the first major market
power cases, United States v. du Pont,145 where the Supreme Court accepted a
test of market power that came to be so disparaged, the case became the namesake for the error: the cellophane fallacy. In du Pont, the Court accepted the defendant’s definition of the market as all flexible wrapping materials, including
products like wax paper and aluminum foil, rather than cellophane itself146—
even though these substitutes were able to compete with cellophane precisely
because du Pont had been underpricing it.147 In short, the Court conflated the
elasticity of demand for a product with the cross-elasticity, or reasonable interchangeability, of the product and its substitute. For this and other reasons, commentators have condemned market definition for its incoherence.148
137

See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (“Since the purpose of
the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement
has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output, can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power,
which is but a surrogate for detrimental effects.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 7
PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1511, at 429 (1986))).
138 HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, § 3.1b, at 106.
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010).
141 HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, § 3.1d, at 111.
142 Id. § 3.2, at 112.
143 Id. § 3.1d, at 111.
144 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 887,
891, 894–95 (2012); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 136, at 960–63; Kaplow, supra
note 140.
145 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
146 Id. at 399–400.
147 See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J.
129 (2007).
148 See Kaplow, supra note 140. For a reply, see Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 740 (2013).
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In dynamic markets, which today consist primarily of internet markets, circumstantial evidence of market power is less important.149 Reliance on market
definition/market share can even lead to erroneous results—most notably, the
inclusion of both merchant and consumer interfaces into a two-sided platform
where a complaint alleges harm only to one side.150 Market definition is also
complicated by a plethora of tests and no systematic way of choosing the right
test for each situation at hand.151
Nonetheless, examinations of collusion and exclusion are seldom complete
without market power analysis of the constituent markets.152 Market power is the
very first step, for instance, in a monopolization action under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act,153 the basis for many of the charges against tech firms.154 It is
therefore a hugely important yet open-ended issue that is assuming even greater
urgency.
2. Balancing Antitrust and Regulation
Another contested issue in antitrust is how courts approach competition in
regulated industries such as finance, telecommunications, and health care. In the
1960s, cases on the balance between antitrust and regulation such as Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange followed a “plain repugnancy” standard, where courts
strived to permit the cohabitation of regulation and antitrust, precluding the latter
only where the former clearly preempted it.155 In the next decade, plain repugnancy became simply “repugnancy,” under which antitrust was to defer if there
was just the potential for conflict with regulation.156 Significantly, this body of
law came in contexts where the statutes in question did not contain an express
antitrust savings clause that preserved antitrust actions, so courts were dealing
with implied antitrust immunity.157 In 2004, however, the Court in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Trinko found that even a statute with an antitrust savings

149

Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1674 (2013).
150 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). For criticisms, see John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497 (2019).
151 See generally Sean P. Sullivan, Modular Market Definition, 55 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1091
(2021).
152 See David Glasner & Sean P. Sullivan, The Logic of Market Definition, 83 ANTITRUST L.J.
293, 295–97 (2020).
153 This is the “power plus conduct” framework of United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563 (1966), and United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
See also Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
154 CHRIS SAGERS, UNITED STATES V. APPLE: COMPETITION IN AMERICA (2019).
155 See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
156 See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
157 See Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 683, 687–89 (2011).
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clause—namely, the Telecommunications Act of 1990—could preclude the application of antitrust laws because of the potential for conflict.158
Over the last half century, then, the doctrine balancing antitrust and regulation has conferred federal courts greater discretion to dismiss private actions over
conduct that might be regulated by administrative agencies.159 In moving from
plain repugnancy to simple repugnancy to presumed repugnancy, this doctrine
now requires antitrust to defer when regulation has spoken, however quietly.
Concomitantly, however, regulators have undergone a paradigm shift in the last
half century, moving away from the filed rate doctrine, whereby natural monopolies had to abide by rates filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC).160 With the gutting and eventual abolition of the ICC, this intrusive regulation was replaced with a framework that prioritizes market transactions, with
regulators merely setting the baselines for competition, a trend commonly but
inaccurately called deregulation.161
The consequences of these shifts are grave. Where regulators have promulgated—and then rescinded—rules to preempt anticompetitive effects,162 federal
courts might not step in to fill the void as a consequence of presumed repugnancy. In bowing to regulators, courts can foster anticompetitive effects, which
hampers innovation and cheats consumers. Since Trinko, academics have offered
a flurry of proposals to overhaul the balance between antitrust and regulation.163
In our era of regulatory abdication, scholars are looking to antitrust to step into
the voids.164 Whether those proposals materialize depends in large part on how
courts strike that balance.
Most recently, the complaints against Facebook filed by the Federal Trade
Commission and state attorneys general and against Google filed by the Justice
Department illustrate the stakes for getting this balance right.165 The government
is pursuing remedies, such as divestiture of Instagram and WhatsApp, that go

158

See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
Shelanski, supra note 157, at 702.
160 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 28, at 1330–34.
161 Id. at 1324–25, 1336–37.
162 Compare Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737 (Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n Apr. 13, 2015) (promulgating net neutrality rules), with Restoring Internet
Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (Dec. 14, 2017) (repealing net neutrality rules).
163 See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008); Adam Candeub, Trinko and Re-Grounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 821 (2005); Shelanski, supra note 157, at 729–31.
164 See, e.g., Samuel N. Weinstein, Financial Regulation in the (Receding) Shadow of Antitrust, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 447 (2019); Tim Wu, Antitrust via Rulemaking: Competition Catalysts,
16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 33 (2017).
165 Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv03590 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 9, 2020) [hereinafter FTC v. Facebook Complaint]; Complaint, New
York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03589 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 9, 2020); Complaint, United
States v. Google LLC, No. 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 20, 2020).
159
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much further than prayers for relief in prior actions.166 Because no sectoral regulation currently exists to constrain tech platforms, courts may face intense pressure to devise remedies for problems as varied as privacy, concentration of political power, and distortionary effect on truth, in addition to straightforward
antitrust considerations such as monopoly power and anticompetitive effects.
B. Observations and Inferences
In this Section, we present and categorize our observations from topic modeling and, where possible, draw preliminary inferences—recognizing that some
inferences may be premature and require further research. Each of the three sets
of visualizations we employ—multilevel, pyLDAvis, and topic browser—comes
with its own advantages and drawbacks. Consequently, we approach modeling
algorithms as an iterative process, adjusting where possible.
1. Macrotrends
a. Diversification of Market Power Cases
Topic modeling is adept at highlighting macrotrends. To harness that power,
we incorporated a histogram function into topic browser view that shows the
relative proportion of each topic in the corpus as time progresses. In running
histograms, we can immediately see how the Market Power and Antitrust–Regulation corpora have changed over the decades (see Figure 5 above).
Starting in the late 1950s, market power cases exploded.167 Initially, these
cases were concentrated in the banking sector, where a slew of mergers were
stayed by regulators and taken to court.168 Bank merger cases are unique enough
to comprise a topic mostly of their own, Topic 14, where several of the top terms
are financial (e.g., “merger,” “tr[ial],” “acquisition,” “bank,” “area,” “customers,” “ftc [F.T.C.],” “share,” “banks,” and “clayton [Clayton Act]”).169 Starting
in the 1970s, however, the number of cases in this topic declines rapidly, both in
absolute numbers and as a proportion of the entire Market Power Corpus.170
166

See, e.g., FTC v. Facebook Complaint, supra note 165, at 51 (praying for relief such as
“divestiture of assets, divestiture or reconstruction of businesses (including, but not limited to,
Instagram and/or WhatsApp), and such other relief sufficient to restore the competition that
would exist absent the conduct alleged in the Complaint”).
167 For an illustration, see Harvard L. Sch., Historical Trends, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT,
https://case.law/trends/ [https://perma.cc/RTH4-467Q] (search for “us: market power”).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated,
418 U.S. 656 (1974).
169 Here, the top cases are Conn. Nat’l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240; United States v. Phillipsburg
Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 306 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J. 1969), vacated, 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
170 The total number of market power cases can be verified on CAP’s historical trends tracker.
A search on CAP for federal cases with “antitrust” and “market power,” for instance, shows
that while antitrust cases have increased dramatically, market power cases have held steady.
See Harvard L. Sch., Historical Trends, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/trends/
[https://perma.cc/RTH4-467Q] (search for “us: antitrust, market power”).
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The only other topic to undergo such a drastic decline is Topic 11, which
includes mostly tying cases. Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts’ tying prohibitions, a seller cannot condition the availability of one item (the desired product)
on the buyer’s purchase of another item (the tied product).171 Tying cases are
among antitrust’s most complicated because courts and scholars have never
agreed precisely on whether the practice merits per se treatment or rule of reason
review.172 According to the leverage theory, if a monopolist dominates the desired product market, then the monopolist can leverage its way into dominance
in the tied product market by conditioning the availability of the desired product
on the purchase of the tied product.173 Afterward, the monopolist can extract two
sets of monopoly rents. The Chicago school, however, has succeeded in advancing its single monopoly profit theory, which holds that a true monopolist does
not need to leverage its way into a tied product market because it can already
extract rents in the desired product market.174 Even though the Supreme Court
continued to treat tying as per se illegal,175 scholars have backed away from an
unequivocal per se stance for decades. Recent work by economists and law scholars has vindicated parts of the leverage theory.176
In place of tying and bank merger cases, litigation-related topics have assumed greater prominence. These include a general litigation topic (Topic 9),177
two litigation topics dominated by conspiracy claims (Topics 10 and 13),178 and

171

See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
172 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).
173 See HOEVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 459.
174 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19 (1957); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE
L.J. 1397 (1967); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925 (1979).
175 See Hyde, 466 U.S. at 2; Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 451.
176 See, e.g., Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2145 (Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds., 2006); Elhauge, supra
note 172, at 397; see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 242 (1986).
177 In Topic 9, the top terms are “summary,” “allegations,” “dismiss,” “injury,” “allege,” “alleges,” and “count.” The top cases are United Tactical Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc.,
143 F. Supp. 3d 982 (N.D. Cal. 2015), Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Const. Co., LLC,
404 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (E.D. Cal. 2005), and Levine v. McLeskey, 881 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Va.
1995).
178 In Topic 10, the top terms are “conspiracy,” “allegations,” “allege,” “agreements,”
“compl[aint],” and “dismiss.” The top cases are In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F.
Supp. 2d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2009), Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d
1287 (11th Cir. 2003), and Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 744 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2014).
In Topic 13, the top terms are “american,” “ex,” “doc [document],” “conspiracy,” “dfw,” “dr
[doctor],” and “information.” The top cases are United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d
1141 (D. Kan. 2001), Med. Diagnostic Imaging, PLLC v. CareCore Nat., LLC, 542 F. Supp.
2d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), and Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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a class actions topic that took off in 1995 (Topic 2).179 The trajectory is one of
market power cases diversifying over time, spanning different types of claims
and procedural strategies, such as class actions. As for the topics that declined in
influence, the fall of bank merger cases is consistent with the increasing permissiveness of antitrust and financial regulators; rather than suing to block bank
mergers, regulators were content to let the financial services industry consolidate
after the 1970s.180 This coincided with U.S. regulators easing up on consolidation
on the assumption that localized markets would be open to greater competition,
with smaller and less efficient banks being absorbed.181 As for the waning of the
tying topic, this coincided with the years the Supreme Court decided two seminal
tying cases: Jefferson Parish Hospital in 1984 and Eastman Kodak in 1992.182
However, ours is not a controlled study, and there may be confounding factors.
Tying cases started to abate, for instance, when the Chicago school became ascendant.
b. Deregulation
The Antitrust–Regulation Corpus, too, exhibited diversification over time,
with cases spanning various industries and regulatory schemes. In this vein, the
decline of two topics is notable: a regulated industries topic (Topic 11183 and, to
a lesser extent, Topic 3.184) Coinciding with their decline, general antitrust litigation topics rose sharply.185
179

In Topic 2, the top terms are “class,” “dr [doctor],” “certification,” “common,” “damages,”
and “members.” The top cases are In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 163
(E.D. Pa. 2007), In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 284 F.R.D. 328 (D. Md. 2012),
and In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 200 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
180 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215
(2002).
181 Id. at 250–51.
182 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
183 In Topic 11, the top terms are “commiss[ion],” “rate,” “gas,” rates,” “price,” “cost,”
“costs,” “ferc [F.E.R.C.],” “natural [gas],” “prices,” “transportation,” “carrier,” “carriers,”
“customers,” “electric,” “energy,” and “icc [I.C.C.].” See generally Cal. Gas Producers Ass’n
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 421 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1970); Brizendine v. Cotter & Co., 4 F.3d 457
(7th Cir. 1993), vacated, 511 U.S. 1103 (1994); S. La. Area Rate Cases v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1970). Interestingly, these cases span both energy and transportation. Both types of cases engage with similar vocabularies. Note these visualizations were
run with fifteen topics over a corpus of 2,720 cases, from filtering down to cases where “antitrust” and “regulation” recur approximately twenty times or more.
184 In Topic 3, the top terms are “exchange,” “cir [circuit],” “conspiracy,” “sherman [Sherman
Act],” “summary,” “american,” “arbitration,” “damages,” “foreign,” “price,” and “securities.”
See generally Hunt v. Mobile Oil Corp., 444 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Zuckerman v.
Yount, 362 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 641 F. Supp. 1246
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
185 This includes Topic 1, whose top terms are “class,” “allegations,” “dismiss,” “fsupp2d [F.
Supp. 2d],” “wl,” allege,” “california,” “consumer,” and “damages.” See generally Counts v.
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These swings cohere with a broader pattern that scholars have previously
noticed, where cases pertaining to the Interstate Commerce Commission were
supplanted by telecommunications cases and other garden variety antitrust litigation. The ICC has its roots in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which
formulated the strict rate-setting rules of the filed rate doctrine, pursuant to which
regulated entities were to file their rates with the Commission.186 The dwindling
of ICC cases portends a shift away from public utility-style regulation and toward
a framework where regulators simply set ground rules designed to maximize
competition within an industry, such as the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a
trend commonly (though not altogether accurately) called deregulation.187
FIGURE 9: ANTITRUST–REGULATION CASES THROUGH THE DECADES

Topic browser histograms are a good starting point for historical trends.
However, because topic browser view lists dozens of terms for each topic, the
details can quickly overwhelm. As a supplement, then, we use the multilevel
visualizations of aggregated modeling to eliminate the “noise” and scale up to a
higher level of abstraction: topic clusters. This type of visualization can reveal
the clusters that now make up the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus, giving a snapshot of how cases and topics have splintered (see Figure 9).

Gen. Motors, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 572 (E.D. Mich. 2017); In re Packaged Seafood Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (S.D. Cal. 2017); Chavez v. Blue Sky Nat. Beverage
Co., 268 F.R.D. 365 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
186 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 28, at 1330–33.
187 Id.

22 NEV. L.J. 685

718

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2

FIGURE 10: MULTILEVEL VISUALIZATION OF ANTITRUST–REGULATION CORPUS

In Figure 10, the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus is broken down into fifteen
clusters that correspond to the regulatory frameworks where antitrust litigation
frequently arises. These include patent,188 health care,189 telecommunications,190

188
189
190

See supra Figure 10 (Cluster 11).
Id. (Cluster 4).
Id. (Clusters 5 and 10).
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banking and securities,191 labor,192 energy,193 banking,194 and dairy industries,195
as well as general regulatory196 and litigation197 clusters. Significantly, Cluster 0,
the largest topic cluster, covers seven topics that share the terms “conspiracy”
and/or “price.” These topics cover almost every imaginable industry, including
oil, diamonds, restaurants, retail space, health care, telecommunications, and
beverages.
The prevalence of “conspiracy” and “price” in Cluster 0 suggests that a
plaintiff’s framing of the defendants’ actions as a conspiracy, contract, or other
agreement over price is the most common strategy. The per se illegality of conspiracies under antitrust obviates the need to gather additional evidence if a plaintiff can successfully couch the defendant’s conduct as an agreement in violation
of the Sherman or Clayton Act.198 Indeed, collusive acts such as price-fixing and
market division are often viewed as the core of antitrust prohibitions.199 In the
difficult instances where defendants mirror one another in conduct, factors that
lead to the inference of agreement can move a case from one of conscious parallelism to coordination.200 Against this doctrinal backdrop, many of the cases in
Cluster 0 feature agreements permitted by regulatory frameworks but nonetheless charged by plaintiffs as anticompetitive.201
c.

Industrial Change

The histograms also tell an intriguing story about industrial change. In both
corpora, there are declines in topics where “manufacturing” and “dealer” are
among the top terms. This decline is particularly notable as a counterpoint to the
finding of Steven Salop and Lawrence White over thirty years ago that

191

Id. (Cluster 8).
Id. (Cluster 6).
193 Id. (Cluster 3).
194 Id. (Cluster 7).
195 Id. (Cluster 14).
196 Id. (Clusters 12, 7, 2, and 13).
197 Id. (Clusters 1 (class actions), 0 (general antitrust litigation), and 9 (expert witnesses)).
198 The antitrust cases standing for the proposition that agreement cannot be inferred from
ambiguous evidence are also the classic summary judgment cases. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
199 See Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527,
545 (2013).
200
The antitrust literature on parallelism is rich. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and
the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); Donald F. Turner,
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To
Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962); C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122
YALE L.J. 1182 (2013). For an illustration, see In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d
622 (7th Cir. 2010), and In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015).
201 See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 542 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass. 1982); Bd. of Com’rs
v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 440 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1971); Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball
Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
192
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manufacturing was overrepresented in private antitrust suits.202 In their seminal
article analyzing data from the Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Study
(the “Georgetown Study”), Professors Salop and White found that 44.3% of defendants and 24.1% of plaintiffs hailed from the manufacturing sector.203 These
results correlate with the types of claims that predominated in the Georgetown
dataset: refusals to deal, horizontal price fixing, tying or exclusive dealing, and
price discrimination—claims reflecting disputes between retailers or wholesalers
and their suppliers.204
Data from the Georgetown Study ends in 1983, but from our corpora, we can
infer that in the following decades, there is a decline in manufacturing and dealer
cases but a rise in health care and patent cases as a proportion of antitrust decisions overall.205 To the extent these patterns reveal a shift in antitrust litigation,
they may also betray a supplanting of manufacturing by health care, intellectual
property, and other sectors. At a doctrinal level, we know, too, that tying and
refusals to deal have been pared back by the courts.206 And at a procedural level,
we can perceive a marked rise in antitrust class actions. Altogether, these trends
appear to confirm the waning of American manufacturing and, as a corollary, the
demise of antitrust litigation between retailers and suppliers.
2. Inference Challenges
Our visualizations do present challenges for drawing inferences. For a variety of reasons, some top cases in a topic wind up being aberrant upon review.
The frequent examples are cases that do not engage substantively with market
power.207 We can partially preempt such results by screening for cases where
query words (e.g., “market power”) appear more than a desired number of times
(e.g., ten times). In this way, the visualizations will be compiled only out of those
cases.

202

Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation,
74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1004–05 (1986). For more on the Georgetown Project, see Lawrence J.
White, The Georgetown Study of Private Antitrust Litigation, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 59 (1985).
203 Id.at 1004.
204 Id. at 1005.
205 The comparison of the Georgetown Study and our corpora is not an apples-to-apples comparison. The Georgetown Study was the joint effort of many attorneys reviewing and hand
coding 2,350 antitrust cases from 1973 to 1983 in five federal districts. By contrast, our dataset
is every federal antitrust decision up to late 2018—some 35,000 cases. Our dataset is both
broader and narrower than the Georgetown dataset. While Salop and White covered settled
cases, we can only look at cases that resulted in a judicial opinion. But our timelines and jurisdictions are broader, and we can also delve more deeply into the language of the cases.
206 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
207 E.g., Wagner v. Circle W. Mastiffs, 732 F. Supp. 2d 792 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (the top case in
the general litigation Topic 18, featuring virtually no discussion of market power because it
was a price fixing case); Bushnell Corp. v. ITT, 973 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Kan. 1997) (second
top case in Topic 18, with no consideration of market power, where Sherman Act § 1 and § 2
claims were dismissed because the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence).
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However, the interest for precise results must be balanced against the ability
of machine learning to create visualizations that portray the corpora in new ways.
A corpus can be restricted algorithmically, for instance, by excluding generic
words (e.g., “court,” “law,” “plaintiff,” and “defendant”) or by collecting cases
that mention key words more than a threshold number of times. Yet at some
point, this strips away a key benefit of the topic modeling: to discern relationships among terms that we might otherwise gloss over.208
a. Aberrant Results
Users of topic modeling must bear in mind that the algorithm constructs topics out of the terms that are most statistically likely to appear together. Thus, a
case may be pushed to the forefront of a tying topic even though the opinion
mentions tying only once—if the rest of the opinion contains all the other terms
associated with the topic.209 This is another common spurious result—one that,
at this point, can only be identified by reading individual cases. Of course, the
user of commercial databases must vet search results as well, so the requirement
to actually read cases is not unique to topic modeling.
By way of comparison, in the Georgetown Study, Professors Salop and
White quantified cases where antitrust was not the central issue but ancillary to
a contract or tort claim (“noncentral cases”) at 21.6% of the corpus, a fairly sizeable proportion.210 Relatedly, 2.4% of the Georgetown corpus featured cases
where an antitrust action was appended as a counterclaim.211 The specter of treble damages under private antitrust litigation would give any counterparty pause.
In some areas of law, such as the Bank Holding Company Act’s anti-tying provisions,212 antitrust counterclaims are almost induced by their quasi-per se treatment.213 It is therefore little surprise that noncentral decisions lurk in our corpora
as well.
b. Machine Versus Human Associations
In harnessing machine learning as a means of distant reading, we are essentially replacing human associations of words and meaning with statistical
208

For now, we have also chosen to restrict our analysis to more general queries so as to
quickly identify the algorithms’ deficiencies.
209 See, e.g., Smith v. Mobil Oil Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (top case in tying
Topic 9, with no consideration of market power). But see R & G Affiliates, Inc. v. Knoll Int’l,
Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (the second top case in Topic 9, which engaged in a
substantive analysis of market power).
210 Salop & White, supra note 202, at 1048–49.
211 Id. at 1048.
212 12 U.S.C. § 1972.
213 For more on the bank tying provisions, see generally Felix B. Chang, Death to Credit as
Leverage: Using the Bank Anti-Tying Provision to Curb Financial Risk, 9 N.Y.U J.L. & BUS.
851 (2013). Tying counterclaims are often found in cases where a lender moves against a
defaulting borrower.
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associations. This, too, can frustrate inferences. The terms in a topic might carry
strong doctrinal associations. For instance, in the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus,
“immunity” figures prominently in Topic 7 (from topic browser visualizations),
suggesting on a cursory perusal that this Topic may bear upon the repugnancy
doctrine and the balance between antitrust and regulation.214 In reviewing the
cases and other terms, we discover that this is actually a Parker immunity topic
concerning antitrust immunity for state action, as opposed to antitrust immunity
through regulatory pre-emption.215 Parker immunity, or the antitrust state action
doctrine, covers certain state and local regulations that affect competition, exempting them from federal antitrust laws.216 It is a variation on federalism questions more typically encountered in constitutional law. By contrast, antitrust immunity in the regulatory setting usually implicates the question of whether
regulation displaces antitrust—and the extent to which an antitrust savings clause
resuscitates private antitrust litigation from regulatory pre-emption.217
We can confirm that Trinko218 and the old cases on repugnancy such as Sil219
ver and Gordon220 do appear in Topic 9—they are just not among the top results.221 In fact, Trinko has a closer association with other topics (e.g., pertaining
to telecommunications, federal legislation, and antitrust procedure) than with antitrust immunity (see Figure 11).222 Here again, the result is not altogether surprising: Trinko comes up under commercial database searches for federal antitrust cases dealing with the Telecommunications Act of 1990, the essential

214

On the general balance between antitrust and regulation, see generally Shelanski, supra
note 157.
215 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The top terms in Topic 7 are “city,” “immunity,” “amendment,” “county,” “ordinance,” “property,” “rights,” “constitutional,” “doctrine,”
“government,” and “local.” Further down the list, terms also include “noerr” (after the NoerrPennington Doctrine) and “parker.” The top cases are Traweek v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 920 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1990), Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist. v. City of Tallahassee,
788 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1986), and Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence, 715
F. Supp. 1000 (D. Kan. 1989). Further down the list, two other top cases are Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), and Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,
471 U.S. 34 (1985), a set of classic cases on state action exemption.
216 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 341.
217 See Shelanski, supra note 157, at 690–94.
218 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
219 Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
220 Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
221 The platform has a “bibliography” feature that lists all cases.
222 Trinko has a 46.6% association with Topic 13 (top words “commission,” “fcc,” “access,”
and “telephone”), a 36.8% association with Topic 4 (top words “price,” “sherman,” “conspiracy,” “jury,” and “monopoly”), and a 5.6% association with Topic 2 (top words “commerce,”
“interstate,” “clause,” “amendment,” and “government”). It has only a 2.2% association with
a topic that has “immunity” as a top term, Topic 3 (top words “exchange,” “cir [circuit],”
“conspiracy,” “sherman,” “summary,” “american,” and “arbitration”).
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facilities doctrine, and antitrust immunity.223 Put differently, a case can constitute
precedent in a number of areas.
FIGURE 11: CROSS-REFERENCE OF TRINKO AND ASSOCIATED TOPICS

Altogether, these instances of imprecision in topic modeling—at least what
the human eye perceives as intuitively imprecise—complicate the ability to efficiently test research questions. As a more tangible example, we might infer
something about how frequently courts engage in market definition from the fact
that the term “share” does not appear across even half of the topics in the Market
Power Corpus (see Figure 12).

223

Interestingly, Trinko is not among the top twenty results in Westlaw under a search for
“antitrust /p regulation /p immunity.” Notably, Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426
F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005), the lower court decision of a Supreme Court opinion closely associated with Trinko, does appear as the fourth result.
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FIGURE 12: TOPIC BROWSER VIEW OF TOPICS CONTAINING “SHARE”

We might reasonably attribute this to two possibilities: either a court has
accepted one party’s market definition and market share calculation, or a court
directly finds market power because there is evidence of anticompetitive effects.
Yet “effect” also does not appear across many topics (see Figure 13), which is
hardly surprising, since anticompetitive effects are difficult enough for economists to measure and even harder for courts to articulate. Significantly, the terms
“share” and “effect” do not overlap in topics, so we might also postulate that
courts are using them as alternative proxies for market power.
FIGURE 13: TOPIC BROWSER VIEW OF TOPICS CONTAINING “EFFECTS”
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As we read the cases in the topics, however, we see that these inferences
must be cautiously drawn. For instance, even within topics where “share” is not
highlighted as among the words (each topic lists approximately fifty top words),
we find that courts often do take up the relevant product market share, even if in
cursory form. There simply may have been fifty other words that show much
more frequently in the topic than “share.”224 Again, however, we should not resort to filtering out too many terms that we consider generic, lest we sacrifice the
fresh perspective of machine learning.
IV. SUPPLEMENTING TRADITIONAL RESEARCH
Nearly a decade ago, scholars in computer science, the field where topic
modeling was invented, noted that model-driven visual analytics can suffer from
problems of interpretation and trust.225 They defined interpretation as “the facility with which an analyst makes inferences about the underlying data” and trust
as “the actual and perceived accuracy of an analyst’s inferences.”226 Today, topic
modeling has entered legal scholarship, and we hold out aggregated modeling as
an improvement. Clearly, though, problems with interpretation linger—not to
mention trust.
This Part addresses problems of interpretation and trust with topic modeling,
extending the analysis to legal research more generally. In doing so, it suggests
how the technique can both complicate and supplement traditional research.
A. A Modest Proposal
As noted above, there are impediments to drawing neat, clean inferences
from our models. We acknowledge that, left unaddressed, these impediments can
snowball into problems of trust. Hence, we have pursued modifications that shore
up topic modeling’s interpretative facilities at a basic level, which bolsters our
scholarly community’s receptivity toward—or trust of—the tool. Embedding a
document reader feature in both multilevel and topic browser views enables our
platform’s users to pull up every case in a cluster or topic. In turn, cases can be
read more thoroughly to check their conformity with their respective topics. This
feature allows us to vet how topic modeling’s information retrieval function
scales to law.
In its early years, topic modeling was deployed to recommend scientific articles in a way that broke down disciplinary silos and cut through citation biases.227 Some of the first computer scientists to experiment with collaborative
224

See Chuang et al., supra note 49, at 444 (“In-depth analyses may require more than inspection of individual words. Analysts may want additional context in order to verify observed
patterns and trust that their interpretation is accurate.”).
225 See id.
226 Id.
227 See Wang & Blei, supra note 50, at 448–50; see also supra notes 50–54 and accompanying
discussion.
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topic modeling, for example, realized that researchers rely on citations to discover articles similar to one they have encountered, which reinforces the bias
toward heavily cited papers.228 Consequently, a scholar will tend to cite others
within their discipline, at the expense of finding relevant literature in another
field.229 Topic modeling was devised as a powerful alternative, to catch the interdisciplinary linkages that might otherwise be overlooked. Staying true to this
legacy, we argue that the best use of topic modeling—for now—might well be
its ability to suggest areas of overlooked scholarship or doctrine.230
As a more concrete example, when we see that an immunity topic contains
a high number of state action cases along with classic decisions on antitrust repugnancy,231 we would read this as a suggestion for scholars interested in antitrust savings clauses to look into Parker immunity. A narrow search for savings
clauses, focusing on landmark cases such as Trinko and Credit Suisse Securities
(USA) LLC v. Billings,232 might otherwise miss this connection, directing the researcher simply to the antitrust–regulation balance. A few scholars writing on
antitrust immunity have already observed the connections between regulatory
pre-emption and state action,233 as has at least one court.234 Yet this is not an
intuitive connection to make, for the body of writings on state action and regulatory immunity have existed without much reference to one another.
As we tinker further with topic modeling, we can make instant improvements to sharpen the platform’s interpretive precision. One upgrade is extending
the numerical filters to individual terms, rather than a combination of all terms.
As of now, we can screen for pertinent results by running visualizations on decisions where “antitrust” and “regulation” occur over a threshold number in each
document. However, that threshold only runs on the combination of search terms.
Thus, in a query for documents where search terms appear fifty times or more,
the algorithms return decisions where “regulation” may appear forty-nine times
in a document but “antitrust” appears only once. Several of the top decisions in
Topic 14 of the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus, for instance, feature the term “antitrust” only in the context of quoting antitrust cases as precedent on

228

Wang & Blei, supra note 50, at 450.
Id.
230 To quote a critic of topic modeling, its utility may well be a “content-based recommendation [system] (such as Facebook advertising products to its users).” Da, supra note 10, at 625.
231 E.g., Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, 228 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2000); Town
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983). These are the top two cases in
Topic 9 in the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus.
232 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Credit Suisse
Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). These are top two cases for savings clauses.
233 See Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to Deregulated Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 613, 661 (2006); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S.
Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1822, 1822 (2007); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at § 19.3c.
234 See Am. Agric. Movement v. Bd. of Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1155 (7th Cir. 1992).
229

22 NEV. L.J. 685

Spring 2022]

MODELING THE CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT

727

injunctions.235 What initially appears to be an antitrust and First Amendment
topic ends up, at least from the top documents, as a constitutional law topic with
antitrust caselaw cited for procedural guidance. This is not altogether surprising,
since many foundational civil procedure decisions spun out of antitrust litigation.236 An easy improvement, however, is to extend the numerical filters to both
“antitrust” and “regulation.”
The results from Topic 14 discussed above, where the top results are noncentral cases, also suggest that the proportion of aberrant results in our two corpora might be quite different. At the very least, aberrant results arise for different
reasons. In the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus, the top decisions in some topics
only feature the term “antitrust” in the context of discussions of procedural precedent. In the Market Power Corpus, by contrast, antitrust issues arise in some
decisions only as counterclaims or ancillary actions, where they are summarily
dismissed. Noncentral or aberrant antitrust decisions emerge more regularly in
the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus. Indeed, the sizes of the two corpora, with Antitrust–Regulation being roughly three times the size of Market Power, appears
to corroborate this thesis.
Overall, it is premature to draw any firm conclusion about the relevance of
results, just as it is too early to aggressively filter out stop words. At this point,
because our aim is to deploy topic modeling for its ability to suggest unexplored
connections to other areas, we should refrain from steering unsupervised machine learning with too heavy a human hand. Thus, we currently see the greatest
value in topic modeling’s ability to distant-read an unstructured dataset and reveal the latent connections.
For a tool as transformative as topic modeling, its usage as a sort of glorified
document retrieval mechanism may seem to be a modest proposal. However,
cross-doctrinal extrapolation is one of the most common ways that legal scholarship has advanced.237 Law scholars are fond of arguing by analogy; topic modeling gives us a better framework for doing so by drawing attention to shared
vocabularies. Fortifying the algorithm’s interpretive precision is one of the most
important tasks before it gains more widespread usage. Harnessing the algorithm’s information retrieval prowess also tests the robustness of its results. If

235

See, e.g., Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Real Truth About
Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 2009); Kiser v. Kamdar, 831 F.3d 784, 791
(6th Cir. 2016); O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973,
978–79 (10th Cir. 2004).
236 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550, U.S. 544 (2007); Matsushita v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1986).
237 See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1707–09
(1993); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120
YALE L.J. 1368, 1370 (2011); Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the
Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 855–56 (2013).

22 NEV. L.J. 685

728

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2

we can prove that aberrant results are minimal, or at least within the range of
prior studies, then we will have also built a foundation for our community’s trust.
B. A Bolder Proposal
Combing through topic modeling visualizations raises interesting questions
about the way we read cases and understand precedent. In each of the datasets,
case names hardly ever surface as top terms. For instance, Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States,238 United States v. Alcoa,239 Grinnell,240 and du Pont,241 all of
them classic market power cases, do not appear as terms in the Market Power
Corpus.242 In a narrowly focused topic—say, on tying—landmark cases such as
Eastman Kodak243 and Jefferson Parish244 do not materialize as terms either.
(The notable exception is Microsoft,245 which shows up more frequently, even
being picked up as a term in multilevel view.)246 This suggests that courts may
be relying less on cases and more on a range of terms and concepts to figure out
market power.
Often, cases that appear as the top results are only infrequently cited by legal
scholars. These cases are not understood to be precedent-setting, though they can
be heavily cited in practitioners’ manuals or by other courts within a federal district or circuit.247 Another discrepancy from commercial databases is that topic
modeling occasionally returns decisions that have been overturned or vacated.248
These results might not be troubling in topics dealing with arcane doctrine (e.g.,
old ICC cases). For their part, commercial databases, too, can lead readers to
overturned decisions. Nonetheless, the ability of Lexis and Westlaw to flag a
decision’s precedential value in its metadata is helpful and cannot yet be replicated by topic modeling.
238

Lorain J. Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 144 (1951).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945).
240 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 566 (1966).
241 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
242 See supra text accompanying note 193. (We know these cases are part of the corpus because they appear in the bibliography.)
243 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
244 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
245 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
246 In the antitrust-regulation cases, Trinko does not appear as a top term. Yet we can confirm
that this case is picked up in the topic modeling by checking against the bibliography. This
may simply be because Trinko is still relatively recent and has not been cited by other cases
incorporated into the modeling.
247 See supra text accompanying note 145 (search in Westlaw’s “citing references” function
for Wagner v. Circle W. Mastiffs, 732 F. Supp. 2d 792 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Bushnell Corp v.
ITT, 973 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Kan. 1997); and Wolf Concept SARL v. Eber Bros Wine & Liquor
Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)). By contrast, see supra text accompanying note
169 (search in “citing references” for Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985)
(seminal Parker immunity case)).
248 See, e.g., Brizendine v. Cotter & Co., 4 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2095
(1994).
239
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More fundamentally, the disparity between the top results from topic modeling and top results from commercial databases calls for reconciliation, but this
is virtually impossible because users know so little about the search algorithms
that Westlaw and Lexis employ. This opacity is a stark problem. Surveying
search results across six different platforms, Susan Mart has found astonishingly
little overlap in the top cases when a query is run.249 As Professor Mart notes,
these inexplicable results are frustrating because the platform operators reveal
virtually nothing about their algorithms.250 On a different level, algorithms compound human biases, and society is urgently re-evaluating the use of artificial
intelligence for predictive purposes.251 The lack of “algorithmic accountability”
on the part of commercial databases is a detriment to research and the legal profession.252
An accountability deficit plagues not just incumbent databases but insurgent
ones as well. Newcomers Casetext, Fastcase, Ravel (now owned by Lexis), and
to some extent Google are challenging Westlaw and Lexis for the legal research
market.253 They promise to harness innovations in information technology to deliver “faster and smarter” legal research.254 Questions remain, nevertheless. Do
the insurgents’ marketing slogans also encompass “cheaper,” especially for academic and nonprofit communities? And given freely available tools such as CAP
and topic modeling, how relevant are for-profit providers?
In pairing CAP with topic modeling, we are not attempting to dethrone the
incumbents. Rather, our goals here are modest—at this stage, as we continue to
fine tune aggregated modeling, we simply seek to supplement traditional doctrinal research.
However, we would advance a bolder proposal as well: by being transparent
with topic modeling’s weaknesses and how we are trying to overcome them, we
intend to force legal research providers to be more forthcoming with their algorithms. This market is seeing more competition than it has in a long time. Powered by data analytics, upstarts are entering the market flaunting ever bolder
claims. As they encroach upon Lexis and Westlaw’s market shares, and as the

249

Mart, supra note 38, at 390 (noting “hardly any overlap in the cases that appear in the top
ten results returned by [Castext, Fastcase, Google Scholar, Lexis Advance, Ravel, and
Westlaw]”).
250 Id. at 389.
251 See Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, The Algorithm That Grants Freedom, or Takes It Away,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/technology/predictive-algorithms-crime.html [https://perma.cc/3LUJ-MY5R].
252 See Mart, supra note 38, at 389 (“Algorithmic accountability in legal databases will help
assure researchers of the reliability of their search results and will allow researchers greater
flexibility in mining the rich information in legal databases. If researchers know generally
what a search algorithm is privileging in its results, they will be better researchers.”).
253 See id. (empirical comparison of legal research providers).
254 What Is Fastcase?, FASTCASE (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.fastcase.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/Y628-K4ME].
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incumbents defend their positions, both sides will have to justify why users
should opt for their services.
Entering this fray, we have shown that, armed with a free dataset and some
open-source algorithms, lawyers can replicate some of the search functionalities
hiding behind paywalls. Admittedly, cobbling these functions together requires
technical skills and often financial backing; however, homemade machine learning will put increasing pressure on for-profit legal research providers. Because
consumers have more options than ever before, the operators of those paywalls
must make the case for their products, including how they are superior. And
when divergent results arise, as they inevitably do,255 we anticipate that users
will press providers for an explanation.
CONCLUSION
Topic modeling algorithms can be modified to address the criticisms of its
detractors by providing greater context at the micro- and macroscopic levels. We
have found that aggregating topic modeling over many iterations helps to eliminate aberrant results while providing contextualization. Simultaneously, our adjustments also highlight details that can serve as metadata to streamline doctrinal
research.
There is still much to be done with our platform and visualizations. Looking
ahead, we plan to improve the platform’s capability to eliminate more generic
words. As this happens, the visualizations will be more informative, and the cases
will be grouped more accurately. Of course, we must exclude terms with care,
lest we compromise the function of uncovering patterns that the machine’s algorithms illuminate.
The source of our dataset, CAP, also raises novel issues. For instance, the
availability of data promises to democratize legal research, but there are still
technical and financial barriers to data extraction and analysis. As alternatives to
large commercial databases emerge, a pitched battle will unfold to capture the
legal research and analytics market.
We see our project as a step in the use of algorithmic topic modeling in legal
research, especially as a complement to commercial databases. Ultimately, we
hope that our project will prompt other collaborations between DH and law,
while pressing information technology insurgents to keep legal research open
and cost-effective. In the near term, however, we can utilize topic modeling for
discrete, mundane tasks such as recommending cases to help scholars and practitioners argue by analogy. Given the advances of CAP and topic modeling, we
are living in one of the most exciting eras for legal research.

255

See Mart, supra note 38, at 389.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix lists the fifteen topic clusters in the Market Power Corpus
(2,591 total decisions) and the fifteen topic clusters the Antitrust–Regulation
Corpus (7,308 total decisions) from topic browser view. In addition, it provides
the proportion of the corpus occupied by each topic, as well as the top terms and
decisions in each topic. Recall that topics are statistical distributions over terms.
Given its size, the Antitrust–Regulation Corpus was filtered down to decisions where the key terms (“antitrust” and “regulation”) occur more than approximately twenty times in each decision, resulting in a total of 2,720 documents.
For both corpora, we excluded the stop words “court,” “law,” “plaintiff,”
“defend,” “defendant,” “see,” “act,” “f3d,” “plaintiffs,” and “defendants” from
the visualizations.
Note the tables are sorted in descending order of cluster size, as measured in
the number of topics in each cluster (as opposed to the number of decisions in
each cluster). Note, too, that because aggregation is over six different models,
some of the clusters will have more cases than are in each corpus. (Each model
can have a maximum of all cases in the corpus; over six cases, that maximum
could grow six-fold.)
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MARKET POWER CORPUS
Cluster

# Cases # Topics

Top Terms in
Cluster

Top Decisions in Cluster
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer
Co., 96 F.3d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc. v. AirSep
Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 348 (W.D.
Pa. 2000); Undersea Breathing
Sys., Inc. v. Nitrox Techs., Inc.,
985 F. Supp. 752 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v.
Chemtronics, Inc., 439 F.2d 1369
(5th Cir. 1970)
Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d
577 (3d Cir. 1974); Fox Motors,
Inc. v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc.,
806 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1986); Petrol. for Contractors, Inc. v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 493 F. Supp. 320
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847
(N.D. Cal. 1970)
Levine v. McLeskey, 881 F. Supp.
1030 (E.D. Va. 1995); Bushnell
Corp. v. ITT, 973 F. Supp. 1276 (D.
Kan. 1997); Wolf Concept S.A.R.L.
v. Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp.,
736 F. Supp.2d 661 (W.D.N.Y.
2010); Yong Ki Hong v. KBS Am.,
Inc., 951 F. Supp.2d 402 (E.D.N.Y.
2013)
Cent. & S. Motor Freight Tariff
Ass’n v. United States, 757 F.2d
301 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Maritime
Comm’n, 653 F.2d 544 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v.
United States, 755 F.2d 1292 (7th
Cir. 1985); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v.
Interstate Com. Comm’n, 656 F.2d
1115 (5th Cir. 1981)

2

915

9

patent, infringement, patents,
said, generic

7

3,853

9

cir [circuit], tying, dealers, jury,
damages

13

3,999

8

injury, allegations, defendants’, dismiss,
summary

1

1,155

7

commission, fcc
[F.C.C.], icc
[I.C.C.], carriers,
gas
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1,012

7

merger, tr [trial],
acquisition, bank,
ftc

0

925

6

nfl [NFL], ncaa
[NCAA], league,
se, dr

3

1,117

6

trial, jury, cost,
cir [circuit], pricing

4

606

6

cable, license, television, programming, fcc
[F.C.C.]

5

872

6

class, dr, members, certification, plaintiffs’
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United States v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md.
1976); United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526
(1973); United States v. Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co., 240 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v.
Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409
(W.D. Mich. 1989)
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball
Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 339 F. Supp.2d 545
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Ass’n for Intercollegiate
Athletics for Women v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 558 F. Supp.
487 (D.D.C. 1983); Chi. Pro. Sports
Ltd. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 874
F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp.
1048 (D.N.J. 1977); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 284 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1960); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 91 F. Supp.
333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Barry Wright
Corp. v. Pac. Sci. Corp., 555 F.
Supp. 1264 (D. Mass. 1983)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994); Time Warner Ent. Co. v.
United States, 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.
1993)
In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 171 (E.D.
Pa. 2015); In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D.
200 (M.D. Pa. 2012); In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 284
F.R.D. 328 (D. Md. 2012); In re
Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig.,
283 F.R.D. 222 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
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603

6

gas, ferc
[F.E.R.C], rate,
energy, commission

10

1,357

6

plaintiffs’, allegations, allege, dismiss, conspiracy

9

1,105

5

hospital, dr [doctor], medical,
hospitals, care

6

220

4

microsoft, software, windows,
operating, microsoft’s
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Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 456
F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2006); Pub.
Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 462 F.3d
1027 (9th Cir. 2006); New Jersey
Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744
F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F.
Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013); Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Dynegy Power
Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756 (9th Cir.
2004)
Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower Rsch.
Cap. LLC, 165 F. Supp. 3d 42
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Commodity
Exch., Inc. Silver Futures and Options Trading Litig., 560 Fed.
App’x 84 (2d Cir. 2014); Burtch v.
Milberg Factors., Inc., 662 F.3d
212 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Interest
Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F.
Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
Koefoot v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons,
610 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. Ill. 1985);
Westchester Radiological Assocs.
P.C. v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 708
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Johnson v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of N.M., 677 F.
Supp. 1112 (D.N.M. 1987); Ball
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1077
(S.D. Ind. 1985)
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999);
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
65 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999);
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 87 F. Supp. 2d 992
(N.D. Cal. 2000); New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp.2d 76
(D.D.C. 2002); Massachusetts v.
Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199
(D.D.C. 2004)
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14

281

3

milk, insurance,
plaintiffs’, rico,
labor

12

122

2

license, ascap
[ASCAP], music,
generic, patent
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In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 510 F. Supp. 381 (W.D.
Mo. 1981); Alexander v. Nat’l
Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th
Cir. 1982); Case-Swayne Co. v.
Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S.
384 (1967); Cochran v. Veneman,
252 F. Supp.2d 126 (M.D. Pa.
2003)
United States v. Am. Soc’y of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, 157 F.R.D. 173 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX
Inc., 683 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2012); In
re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp.,
756 F. Supp.2d 516 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); United States v. Am. Soc’y
of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 981 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)

ANTITRUST–REGULATION CORPUS
Cluster # Cases # Topics

Top Terms in
Cluster

Top Decisions in Cluster
World Wide Rush LLC v. City of
Los Angeles, 605 F. Supp.2d 1088
(C.D. Cal. 2009); Anselmo v. Cty.
of Shasta, Cal., 873 F. Supp.2d
1247 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov,
Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona, 915 F.
Supp. 2d 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
Dolls, Inc. v. City of Coralville,
Iowa, 425 F. Supp. 2d 958 (S.D.
Iowa 2006)
Shady Grove Ortho. Assocs., P.A.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 293 F.R.D. 287
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260 (D.
Mass. 2004); Jacob v. Duane
Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Belfiore v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 311 F.R.D.
29 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

12

2,121

9

city, property,
immunity,
amendment, government

1

1,799

8

price, product,
prices, sales,
products
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0

3,342

7

Sherman [Sherman Act], conspiracy, price, cir
[circuit], defendants’

4

1,291

7

health, medical,
hospital, insurance, dr [doctor]

7

1,861

7

commerce, interstate, clause, government, amendment

14

962

7

price, prices,
milk, product,
sales

2

905

6

regulations,
agency, preemption, government,
insurance
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USA Petrol. Co. v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988);
Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champ. Spark
Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir.
1983); Red Diamond Supply, Inc.
v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d
1001 (1st Cir. 1981); Midw. Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734
F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1984)
U.S. ex rel. Villafane v. Solinger,
543 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. Ky.
2008); Catanzano by Catanzano v.
Dowling, 847 F. Supp. 1070
(W.D.N.Y 1994); Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984);
Wash. Hosp. v. White, 889 F.2d
1294 (3d Cir. 1989)
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985);
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564 (1997)
Longview Refining Co. v. Shore,
554 F.2d 1006 (Temp. Emerg. Ct.
App. 1997); In re Midw. Milk
Monop. Litig., 510 F. Supp. 381
(W.D. Mo. 1981); Reynolds Indus.
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 569 F. Supp.
716 (D. Mass. 1983); Pac. Supply
Co-op v. Shell Oil Co., 697 F.2d
1084 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App.
1982)
Long v. U.S. Dept. of Just., 450 F.
Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2006); United
States v. Sunny Cove Citrus Ass’n,
854 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Ca. 1994);
Garrelts v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 943 F. Supp. 1023 (N.D.
Iowa 1996); Stainback v. Mabus,
671 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2009)
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3

1,430

6

rate, gas, commission, rates,
ferc [F.E.R.C.]

5

735

6

cable, fcc
[F.C.C.], television, speech,
amendment

8

709

6

bank, loan, securities, shares,
credit

6

817

5

labor, union, employer, employees, preemption

10

769

5

commission, fcc
[F.C.C.], access,
telephone, agency
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Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 216
F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Ca. 2002);
Town of Norwood v. FERC, 202
F.3d 392 (1st Cir. 2000); New York
v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002); E. &
J. Gallo Winery v. EnCana Corp.,
503 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2007)
Satellite Broad. & Commc’ns Ass’n
v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 (4th Cir.
2001); Time Warner Ent. Co. v.
United States, 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.
1993); Time Warner Ent. Co. v.
FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund
Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d
511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); CSX Corp. v.
Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK)
LLP, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011);
In re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig.,
346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y.
2004)
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978); Signatory Negot. Comm. v. Local 9, Int’l Union
of Operating Eng’rs, 447 F. Supp.
1384 (D. Colo. 1978); Connell
Const. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975); Local 210, Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Lab. Rels. Div.
Assocd. Gen. Contractors of Am.,
844 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1988)
Cap. Network Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 3
F.3d 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 909 F.2d
1510 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Fones4All
Corp. v. FCC, 550 F.3d 811 (9th
Cir. 2008); AT&T Corp. v. Adventure Commc’n Tech., LLC, 207 F.
Supp. 3d 962 (S.D. Iowa 2016)
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1,308

5

commission, rate,
rates, agency, exchange

11

575

4

patent, fda
[F.D.A.], drug,
drugs, loan

9

193

2

tr [trial], dr [doctor], expert, testimony, price
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New England Power Co. v. United
States, 693 F.2d 239 (1st Cir.
1982); App. of FTC Line of Bus.
Rep. Litig., 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 656 F.2d
1115 (5th Cir. 1981); W. Coal Traffic League v. United States, 694
F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1982)
Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co.,
375 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ca. 1974); In
re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336
(S.D. Fla. 2004); Lexmark Int’l,
Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816
F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ark.
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund
v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.
2010)
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F.
Supp. 3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016);
United States v. Am. Exp. Co., 88
F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015);
FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp.
3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015)

